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ABSTRACT 
The fratricidal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1992 and 1995 was 
the third and most brutal chapter of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The war left the 
country devastated and deeply divided along ethnic lines. Pursuant to the impotence of 
the International Community (IC) to stop the fighting, and after the humanitarian and 
political consequences of the war had finally become unbearable, a delicate and 
complicated compromise was hammered out in Dayton. 
Twelve years have passed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which 
have seen immense international investment. While official rhetoric by the International 
Community seems to suggest that there is constant progress in state and nation building, 
academic in-depth studies and close political observers are more skeptical. There is no 
consensus as to how viable BiH is today. 
This thesis first develops different criteria for state viability in ethically divided 
societies, derived from the literatures on strong and weak states and on the post-Westphalian 
system. This concept is then applied to the Bosnian case. Since internal and external security 
are the principal political goods deliverable for the inhabitants of any state and taking into 
consideration that the state has to have the monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the 
defense reform process since 2003 is taken as the major indicator for the state viability of 
Bosnia today. The thesis concludes that despite much progress Bosnia is not yet viable 
without further international assistance. 
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As Communism declined in the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was, in many ways, better 
placed than any other communist state to make the transition to a multi-party democracy, 
either as a single state or as a group of successor states. There was a real chance for 
Yugoslavia to take its place in a new and, at that time, hopeful community of European 
nations.1 However, the collapse of the Communist block led to the re-emergence of 
ethnic tensions in many European countries, and to the deadliest war in Europe, in a 
region which seemed to be the most promising among the socialist states both 
democratically and economically. In Yugoslavia, the emergence of resident Serbian 
nationalism, led and orchestrated by the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic in the late 
1980s, strained the multi-ethnic state to breaking point.2 The war left Bosnia’s 
infrastructure and economy in tatters. Around two million people – about half of the 
population – were displaced and unable to return home safely.3 
The International Community has played a dominant role in Bosnian affairs since 
1995. The Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) offered an agenda for peace, not a finished 
architecture. Critics of Dayton voiced fears that the two Entities (the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation and the Republika Srpska, RS) came too close to being states in their own 
right, and that the arrangement reinforced separatism and nationalism at the expense of 
integration. The success story of Dayton primarily pertains to military implementation.4 
The stable environment it brought enabled the country gradually to strengthen the role of 
                                                 
1 Laura Silber and Allan Little, “Introduction,” in Yugoslavia Death of a Nation. (New York, NY: 
Penguin Books, 1996), 26. 
2 Hermann Kirnter and Werner Hingelmann, “From the French Revolution to the Present/The Post-
Cold War Period/The Break-up of Yugoslavia,” in The Penguin Atlas of World History 2 (Penguin Books 
Ltd., 2004). 
3 BBC News/Country Profiles, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/country_profiles/1066886.stm (accessed: May 12, 2007). 
4 R. Craig Nation, “The Land of Hate: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-95,” in War in the Balkans, 1992 – 
2002 Strategic Studies Institute (2003), 195. 
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the central government and to work on integration and reconciliation. A key 
breakthrough was achieved in late 2005 when agreement was reached on creating both a 
unified multi-ethnic national police force and a defense force, replacing the separate 
forces still operating in both Entities.5 This was another step allowing the international 
security presence (the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR, now the EU-led EUFOR) to be 
radically reduced, although still considered essential.  
Still, the authority of the IC, coordinated by the High Representative (HR) in 
Sarajevo, is deemed to be crucial for reaching compromise among the three ethnic groups 
in Bosnia. Despite Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) being one of the poorest countries in 
Europe, and despite its backwardness caused by recent historical events, its process for 
becoming a full member of NATO and EU has been clearly spelled out. An intermediate 
step which lies ahead is the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the EU. 
B. PURPOSE 
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), responsible for supervising 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, was supposed to finally close this year . 
However, due to the High Representative’s evaluation and request, the Peace 
Implementation Council postponed the closure of this civilian office for one year, until 
June 2008. Bosnians have to be aware that twelve years after Dayton it is now their own 
responsibility for getting along. But the HR does not deem the time ripe for withdrawal. 
The significance of ownership and the need for a viable state is further illuminated by the 
fact that BiH is lagging well behind all the other countries in the region in signing the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union. It will, in the words 
of the current High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling, soon have to “travel the 
remainder of the way under its own steam.”6 Is Bosnia ripe for this step? Or is it 
premature, driven by an exit-strategy that is mainly motivated by domestic pressure in the 
                                                 
5 BBC News, Country profile: Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
6 Christian Schwartz-Schilling, Bosnia and Herzegovina Must Move Forward Under Its Own Steam, 
OHR Press Release, http://www.ohr.int/dwnld/dwnld.html?content_id=37688, (accessed: 7/31/2006). 
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contributing countries to reduce the burden of international peacekeeping and financial 
subsidy? Experts argue about the fragility of this country twelve years after Dayton, as it 
is primarily ethnic strife that continues to undermine state viability in this country. 
Signals of continuing ethnic stereotyping, which might lead to paralysis and state failure, 
abound. In 2006, the Bosnian Prime Minister, a Serb, called for a secession of the RS from 
BiH and for joining Serbia following the Montenegrin referendum of independence. Also, 
August last year has seen several incidents, which raised ethnic tension to a level not seen for 
years. Diplomats and international officials fear that these events “could threaten to unravel 
the long complex process aimed at making BiH a cohesive state that can operate without 
foreign intervention.”7 
This thesis will take up these troubling questions and scrutinize closely the 
viability of the state in BiH at this critical juncture. The central question this thesis seeks 
to investigate is: How strong is the federal state of BiH after twelve years of immense 
international investment in the country? In order to answer this question, a subset of 
questions has to be posed first: 
1. What is a viable state? What are the indicators of a viable state? 
2. What are weak/failing states and why are they failing? 
3. How do ethnic factors contribute to state viability or failure? 
Given these indicators, one should be able to consider in more detail how viable 
BiH today really is. It is not possible to look at all the indicators of state viability which 
are discussed in the literature. Instead, since the DPA is the point of departure in this 
endeavor, the thesis will scrutinize the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and 
focus on one indicator which is deemed of extraordinary relevance for this specific 
conflict constellation: the full control of a government over the armed forces, including 
police, on its own territory. The thesis argues that if this is not guaranteed, state viability 
is seriously in question. This is especially true in ethnically divided societies where 
ethnicities have a history of fighting one another (including ethnic cleansing). 
                                                 
7 Nicholas Wood, “Fiery Campaign Imperils Bosnia’s Progress, Officials Warn,” The New York Times 
(August 27, 2006). 
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Reconciliation has hardly taken place since the last round of war, and some ethnicities 
still hold secessionist or rather irredentist claims undermining the very viability of this 
state. In such a situation, all ethnicities have serious incentives to prepare what might at 
some point become another round of war-fighting, instead of giving up their own armed 
forces and substituting them with a joint force under the command of another ethnicity. 
This is the exact reason why it took so long for both ethnic groups in BiH to at least agree 
in principle, under enormous external pressure, to create a joint police and armed forces.  
Because of this rationale, the thesis will focus on the ongoing Defense Reform in 
BiH. It hypothesizes that in ethnically divided countries giving up ethnically segregated 
forces in favor of one unified force is the supreme factor for creating state viability. The 
thesis will thus seek to investigate the process of Defense Reform in BiH. This process, it 
is supposed, does indicate how much Muslims, Croats and Serbs living in BiH are willing 
to make their common state viable and strong. The results will also shed light on the 
future prospects of BiH, the need for a continued international presence and the direction 
which needs to be taken in order to increase state viability in this crucial sector. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The International Community and especially the U.S. as the chief architect of 
Dayton has supreme interest in assuring that this multifunctional post-conflict peace-
building experiment of historic dimension in BiH, the first of its kind, is a success. Thus, 
the stabilization of this country will continue to need close international monitoring, 
serving three primary purposes: firstly, since BiH will finally enter into NATO and EU, 
this country needs sincere preparation. Secondly, the whole progress made in stabilizing 
the Balkans since the Kosovo war of 1999 rests on pacifying the most troublesome 
countries, including BiH and Kosovo. As in the past, one crisis with horizontal escalation 
might spoil the whole process of stabilization in the region. Thirdly, Bosnia is the first 
state designed by external powers as part of post-conflict peace-building following 
international intervention. Thus, the success or failure of the process serves as a first-
hand lesson for other post-conflict peace-building efforts. 
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Concerning academic writing, there is no consensus as to how viable BiH is 
today. While official rhetoric by the International Community seems to suggest that there 
is constant progress in state and nation building, academic in-depth studies and close 
political observers are much more skeptical. Thus, it is worthwhile to review the main 
arguments and come to one’s own conclusions. Further, there is a lack of silver bullet in 
linking state viability criteria explicitly to BiH and no literature looking at state viability 
through the lens of Defense Reform. Consequently, this thesis promises two major 
contributions: a more realistic picture of the state viability of BiH, with profound 
implications for international peace-building; and a conceptual innovation linking three 
theoretical fields which are usually separated: state viability, ethnic conflict, and defense 
reform. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The state viability of Bosnia since Dayton is the dependent variable (DV). For 
state viability in ethnically divided societies several indicators are designated, among 
them and most prominent for this purpose is the control over the armed forces on the 
whole territory of a state. International peace-building in such environments first of all 
needs to guarantee this control by the central government in order to generate sustainable, 
stable peace. The factors which cause this state’s viability in divided societies are the 
independent variables (IV). A specific look at attempts to create unified armed forces in 
ethnically divided societies and its causal effect on state viability will be included in this 
discussion. Other factors that promote or weaken state viability will be the Intervening 
Variables (IntV). The case study on Bosnia serves as an illustration of how defense 
reform in those societies can foster state viability and how local spoilers resist this 
centralization move in order to keep the state weak, contrary to the interests of the peace-
building efforts of the International Community. 
Before an attempt to scrutinize and define the state viability of Bosnia can be 
done, the development of the theoretical basis for this undertaking will be viewed in 
several steps. First it will be necessary to take into consideration different approaches of 
the concept of the state, especially as concerns indicators of state viability. Here it is 
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important to pay special attention to a state’s sole monopoly over the use of force on its 
entire territory. Furthermore, in order to understand the differences between a Western 
European perception of the state in the contemporary world and the more traditional view 
of the state in the Western Balkan region, it is important to inspect the evolution of the 
Westphalian state system and determine how the Balkans and Bosnia fit into that. After 
that it’s important to look at those factors which can undermine the viability of a state, 
specifically in ethnically divided societies like Bosnia. Owing to the situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, special attention will be paid to the attributes of power-sharing and to 
spoilers, who, sometimes invisibly, undermine the efforts of the International Community 
in peace-building. Finally, the thesis turns to the implications of the ethnic element, and 
highlights a two-directional (both top-down and bottom-up) causality of ethnicity with 
regard to state viability.  
The third chapter turns to the single case study and thus to empirics, scrutinizing 
the attributes of state viability and weakness as the mirror opposite of a strong state by 
analyzing the Dayton Peace Accords and their implementation. The chapter begins with 
the short investigation of the DPA; it then highlights the military as well as the civilian 
aspects of the agreement. First: an analysis of whether the implementation of the military 
aspects has contributed to state viability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to what extent. 
Second: a scrutiny of the implementation of the civilian aspects in more depth, paying 
special attention to those indicators ( IntV), which are among the most important 
attributes of a viable state, i.e., legitimacy of the state, strength of state institutions, 
political participation of the society, free and fair elections, freedom of media and voice. 
The fourth chapter will concentrate on defense reform in Bosnia. It was designed 
specifically to ensure the monopoly over the use of force over the entire territory of 
Bosnia, which is the most important attribute of a viable state. The chapter will first 
investigate the implications of defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then 
introduce all the difficulties and the steps taken by the International Community to 




chapter will illuminate the impenetrable nature of ethnic strife especially at the beginning 
of the process, though highlighting that it was partially generated by the constitution 
drafted following the DPA itself. 
The conclusion returns to the initial hypothesis that despite the enormous steps 
taken both by the International Community and the Bosnian authorities, Bosnia and 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself.8 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The overwhelming majority of studies on Bosnia and Herzegovina focus on three 
major issues: the history and disintegration of Yugoslavia; the war in BiH; and the 
Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 and the evolution of separate aspects of this agreement. 
However, there is very little available on the viability of the Bosnian state. While most 
publications emphasize the achievements of international peace-building in BiH, this 
analysis takes a different perspective. It examines how far the Bosnians themselves are 
willing and able to govern their country (the “ownership” principle). However, 
scrutinizing the viability of the Bosnian state requires first a clarification of the concept 
of a state and arriving at an operational definition of state, state strength and state 
stability, looking also at the concept of weak or failing states. Further, in the case of BiH, 
it is necessary to investigate the role of the competing ethnic identities that prevent or 
weaken the emergence of a shared national identity. 
This chapter thus will investigate major conceptions of and different approaches 
to the state. The point of departure in this endeavor is the traditional Weberian definition 
of the state which will be followed by the introduction of the change of basic conceptions 
since the establishment of the Westphalian modern state. Thus, the chapter will 
demonstrate the different perception of state in Western Europe and the more traditional 
view in the Western Balkans. Next it will introduce those criteria which have pivotal 
importance in defining state viability, and it will put under microscope those elements—
                                                 
8 James Madison, “The Federalist No. 51,” Independent Journal (February 6, 1788) Available at: 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm (accessed: April 9, 2007). 
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ranging from troubles posed by artificially crafted power-sharing systems to spoilers and 
finally ethnic cleavages—which can undermine state viability. 
B. CONCEPTS OF THE STATE 
1. The Meaning and Major Characteristics of the State 
While the process of globalization is peculiar to the contemporary world and 
several supranational organizations have emerged around common norms, the state is still 
the most widely accepted model of political order. Since the existence of the human 
being, it has been widely acknowledged that social groups belong together according to 
some kind of distinct relationship. Ties are formed by common language, skin color, 
religion and territory. Families, tribes, clans, churches, empires, other interest groups and 
states are bounded together by a common “we-feeling.”9 Within any kind of association 
of people, humans have always been led, ruled and governed. Any kind of human 
community has a certain pattern of political organization that governs its participating 
members’ behavior. However, the state is a form which is distinct from tribes, clans and 
gens.10 
Throughout history the state has always been difficult to define. While “the state 
is an abstract entity which can be neither seen, nor heard, nor touched,”11 according to 
Ferguson and Mansbach, “there is nothing more central to political and social theory than 
the nature of the state, and nothing more contested.”12 While numerous scholars have 
offered a concomitant plethora of competing definitions of the state, approaches in 
defining the state and the theories of the origin of the state are enormously varied. A 
comparison of these definitions leads to three major elements peculiar to a state: first, a 
                                                 
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(Verso, 1999). 
10 Brian R. Nelson, “State formations,” in The Making of the Modern State: A Theoretical Evolution 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 7. 
11 Martin van Creveld, “Before the State: Prehistory to AD 1300,” in The Rise and Decline of the State 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 
12 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of 
International Relations Theory (Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 1. 
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state is a set of institutions, the most important of which controls the means of force and 
coercion. Second, these institutions are at the center of a geographically-bounded 
territory; and finally, the state monopolizes rule making within its territory.13 Thus, the 
state is a kind of sovereign entity, whose capacity depends on its ability to effectively 
impose its monopoly of coercive power on life within its own territory and represents its 
inhabitants in foreign affairs. Thus, for the state to be viable, it must be able to centralize 
the coercive powers of law, administration and military force. 
The very first dominant conception of state emerged in Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
published in 1651, which, according to Martin Carnoy, “was one of the first attempts to 
systematize human political behavior according to deductive logic and the laws of 
motion, the seventeenth century concepts that had so revolutionized scientific 
investigation.”14 Hobbes contends that the state exists because it is useful for all 
individuals in society. The state represents the “collective will.” David Held adds that 
“human beings are moved by their desires, they are self-interested. In order to fulfill their 
desires, human beings seek power. Thus, conflicts of interest are inevitable: they are a 
fact of nature.”15 This state-society relation implies, in the words of Sebastian von 
Eisenstein, “not only the submission of all members of society to the state, but also a 
responsibility by the state to deliver services, most notably security but also – according 
to more recent contract theory – social justice.”16  
A traditional definition of the state, associated with the German Max Weber, 
refers to a certain group that claims to monopolize the use or licensing of violence within 
a given territory. He defined a state as “a relation of men dominating men, a relation 
supported by means of legitimate violence” and as “a human community that 
                                                 
13 John A. Hall, “General Commentary,” in The State: Critical Concepts edited by John A. Hall, Vol. 
1. (Routledge, 1994), 3. 
14 Martin Carnoy, “The State and American Political Thought,” in The State and Political Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 15. 
15 David Held, “Central Perspectives on the Modern State,” in Political Theory and the Modern State: 
Essays on State, Power, and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 15. 
16 Sebastian von Einsiedel, “Policy Responses to State Failure,” in Making States Work: State Failure 
and the Crisis of Governance, edited by Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (United 
Nations University Press, 2005), 15. 
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(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”17 The security of states was therefore threatened by any change that might 
undermine that monopoly of violence – whether through external invasion or internal 
rebellion. Since the end of the Cold War, however, many of the most significant threats to 
state security have been internal, rather than external, a shift which has only accelerated 
and may have profound consequences for the conduct of international relations. 
However, these definitions reflect only the ideal type of a state. Joel S. Migdal 
uses a more operational definition in his latest book: “The state is a field of power 
marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, 
controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by 
that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.”18 Migdal adds that “the 
state is an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the 
state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and 
implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making 
for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its 
way.”19 He emphasizes that the state is not more than a certain form of political 
organization, an institution of society. It is a distinct part of society, playing a special role 
that sets it apart from other social groups. He argues that “for those of us in the West, the 
state has been part of our natural landscape. Its presence, its authority, its place behind so 
many rules that fashion the minutiae of our lives, have all been so pervasive that it is 
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difficult for us to imagine the situation being otherwise.” The state does not exist outside 
or above society, and these two institutions constantly interact.20 
Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur define likewise: “The modern state is a 
manifestation of political power that has been progressively depersonalized, formalized 
and rationalized; the state is the medium through which political power is integrated into 
a comprehensive social order. In idealized form, the state embodies the political mission 
of a society; its institutions and officials express the proper array of techniques that are 
used in efforts to accomplish that mission.”21 
Unlike Migdal, Theda Skocpol takes a state-centered rather than a society-
centered approach when examining states. She contends that a state, “is any set of 
relatively differentiated organizations that claims sovereignty and coercive control over a 
territory and its population, defending and perhaps extending that claim in competition 
with other states. The core organizations that make up a state include the administrative, 
judicial, and policing organizations that collect and dispense revenues, enforce the 
constitutive rules of the state and society, and maintain some modicum of domestic order, 
especially to protect the state’s own claims and activities.” 22 
A key argument of her work is that states have the autonomy and the capacity to 
carry out their policies despite opposition from within society; therefore states should be 
the central focus of study and not the society. Nevertheless, she does concede that social 
factors do affect whether states have autonomy. She makes the case that “state autonomy 
is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system.”23 State autonomy does 
change based on the crisis that it may face. This is problematic because when looking at 
                                                 
20 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 15. and see J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual 
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2. 
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autonomy as a variable while studying states, Skocpol does not provide (a) the criteria to 
assess whether a state is strong/weak in terms of autonomy, and (b) a method to measure 
the autonomy of a state. 
According to the Marxist view the state is an expression, or condensation of 
social-class relations, and these relations imply domination of one group by another. 
Hence, the state is both a product of relations of domination and their shaper.24 Marx 
argues that the state exists because it is useful to the ruling class. The state represents 
special interests, not collective will, unless it is controlled by the working class. 
Marx holds that the state, emerging from the relations in production, does not 
represent the common good; it is the political expression of the class structure inherent in 
production. Hegel (and Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Smith) saw the state as charged 
with the representation of the “social collectivity,” as standing above particular interests 
and classes and ensuring that competition among individuals and groups remains orderly 
while the “common interests” are pursued by the state itself. Marx eventually rejected 
this view that the state is the trustee of the society as a whole. Once he came to his 
formulation of capitalist society as a class society, dominated by the bourgeoisie, it 
necessarily followed that the state is the political expression of that dominance. Indeed, 
the state is an essential means of class domination in capitalist society. He contends that 
“it is not above class struggles, but deeply engaged in them.”25 Marx and Engels argued:  
As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but as 
it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, 
as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, 
which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically 
dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and 
exploiting the oppressed class. Thus the state of antiquity was above all 
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as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the 
peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an 
instrument of exploitation of wage labor by capital.26 
The troubling point of the traditional definitions of the state is that the vast 
majority of scholars focused only on ideal-type homogenous nation-states, but did not 
open the “black box” of heterogeneity within a state. Thus, in the contemporary world 
one has to take the divergence of nations and states into consideration as well, 
scrutinizing the connection between ethnicity, nation and state. Following Weber, Lars-
Erik Cederman defines the nation not simply as a group of people with shared language, 
history and identity, but as a “community of sentiment which would adequately manifest 
itself in a state of its own and hence tends to produce a state of its own.”27 He argues that 
“where the state and the nation do coincide, it is legitimate to refer to the nation-state,” 
thus, “there can be no nations independently of the state system.”28 However, we also 
have both, he contends: nations/ethnies without a state, and states with multiple ethnies. 
Yugoslavia was a case in point. 
According to Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “a nation is a distinctive group of people 
who feel a communal bond on the basis of culture, history, religion, geography, or 
linguistics, while a state is a political actor defined by territorial borders, political 
organization, and recognized legitimacy.”29 Legitimacy is a crucial dimension of state 
strength because it reflects the citizens’ mind-set toward the state. She contends that 
nation-building in peace-building operations is a two-fold process: “state-building 
implemented by external actors and identity-building implemented by grassroots actors 
within the state itself.”30 The distinction of this top-down and bottom-up elements is 
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important, because “while outside actors initiate state-building, identity-building must be 
initiated and sustained by citizens within the target state. Top-down and bottom-up 
processes work independently; the shape of the state envisioned by outside actors may 
not correspond to the identities developed by internal actors. Identity-building cannot be 
forced or imposed.”31 Gerald F. Alfred adds that “the nation-state, which has become the 
basic unit of international political order, is predicated on the notion that the nation is an 
expanded form of ethnic association, and that within the context of that form, the set of 
governing institutions we refer to as “the state” emerge in response to environmental 
factors of increasing complexity in both economic and social terms. Thus there is a 
presumed continuity, first between ethnicity and nationhood, and then between 
nationhood and statehood.”32 
2. The Westphalian System and Its Evolution 
The nucleus of the Westphalian state system, which emerged following the series 
of peace treaties at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, was a critical juncture in the 
development of the modern international system composed of sovereign states. The ideal 
type Westphalian state has distinct boundaries, and the Westphalian ideal of sovereignty 
stresses the principle of the inviolability of those borders and non-intervention in internal 
affairs. Different forms of states have constituted different meanings of sovereignty and 
been associated with different conceptions of territoriality over time and across place.33 
In the intervening period the concepts of state, sovereignty and territoriality has 
tremendously changed.  
The twentieth century witnessed the most conspicuous changes. At the beginning 
of the century most of the great European powers were rather empires than mere states 
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and the empire was the natural state form for the great powers.34 While the empires ruled 
most of the world and the world was a European world at the beginning of the century, 
the world was increasingly divided into nation-states just a few decades later. 
Throughout the 20th century several new criteria and prerequisites have been 
added to the “recognition” side of sovereignty. At the beginning of the 20th century, states 
were said to be capable of fulfilling their international commitments and obligations. 
After the Cold War, responsible governance implicitly became a prerequisite for state 
recognition.  
Concerning the evolution of the concept of territory/territoriality it can be argued 
that from the age of the absolutist states of the 17th century through the Napoleonic wars 
the boundaries delimiting the great powers have shown dramatic changes. Initially, the 
legitimacy of interstate borders was defined in dynastic terms: state territory was the 
exclusive property of ruling families, and they had an absolute right to rule their 
territories. But this international order did not reflect any absolute right to particular 
territory that could legitimately change hands by inheritance, marriage, war, 
compensation, and purchase. In these early centuries of the Westphalian order territory 
was the main factor that determined the security and wealth of states, and most of the 
wars led to changes of territory; this practice continued until the middle of the twentieth 
century.35 
Even in the twentieth century territorial disputes have been the major cause of 
enduring interstate rivalries, the frequency of war, and the intensity of war. Few interstate 
wars were fought without any territorial issue being involved in one way or another.36 
Regarding the enormous movement of borders, the same is true if we glance at any map 
of Europe over the course of the 20th century. In the midst of the 20th century, when the 
nation-state emerged as the predominant state form and the principle of non-intervention 
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was widely adhered to, the boundaries between states were perceived to be sharply 
drawn. The movement of people became increasingly difficult as state after state raised 
barriers to entry. It was only after the advent of the nuclear age that states reluctantly 
began to recognize their strategic vulnerability and their increased reliance on territorial 
protection provided by nuclear deterrence. The change in thinking about the salience of 
territory is striking.37 The whole notion of interdependence that arose in the mid-1970s, 
following e.g., the global impact of the oil crisis and of the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods System, further helped to question the notion of national sovereignty. America’s 
repeated efforts to develop a national missile defense shield can be interpreted as an 
attempt to reconstruct a hard, and a virtually physical boundary around the United States, 
thus stemming the tide of global interpenetration. 
In Europe specifically, but increasingly beyond, processes of integration 
undermined the notion of sovereignty, as symbolized in the Common Market, the 
Schengen Treaty and the European Monetary Union. The enlargement of NATO and the 
European Union further spurred this integrationist drive, now encompassing the whole 
continent. However, it is remarkable how since the early 1990s the processes of 
integration run in parallel to processes of disintegration in the Central and Eastern 
Europe. This second vector implies a resurgence of traditional nation-state concepts, of 
in- and out-group perceptions and thus borders. The unification of Germany, the break-up 
of the former Yugoslavia, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the partition of 
Czechoslovakia all testify to this. The disjuncture between nations/ethnies and states that 
was subdued during the Cold War confrontation resurfaced in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Surely, the emerging European order has overall been associated with a declining 
attachment to territory, though one should be careful not to equate Western and Eastern 
Europe in this respect or to cultivate a West European selection bias. The secessionist 
conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, the drive for the independence of Montenegro and 
Kosovo, the struggle for independence of Chechnya and the ethnic fragility of Russia 
demonstrate how much political thinking in Eastern Europe still clings to traditional 
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concepts of sovereignty and statehood. The meaning and significance of boundaries is 
changing, but contrasting perceptions continue to exist or are even more pronounced in 
and beyond Europe. 
Thus, European thinking on sovereignty is today Janus-faced. On the one hand, 
following William Wallace, I agree that “it is arguable that the region within which the 
modern state system emerged is now moving towards a post-modern and post-sovereign 
political system, in which authority will be shared among different levels of government 
– and in which the Westphalian concept of sovereignty will have disappeared with a more 
diverse and open international civil society emerging in its place with multiple levels of 
authority and governance.”38 The perception and meaning of sovereignty, based on the 
Westphalian state model, dramatically changed with European integration. The EU is 
moving towards pooled sovereignty in a multilevel system of governance. The 
significance of borders has diminished; members of the European Union (EU) are 
successively transferring power to the European level, thus, moving towards a post-
Westphalian order. 
Yet the striking difference to the perception of borders and territoriality in Eastern 
and South Eastern Europe (SEE) since the 1990s should not be overlooked. It is the result 
of belated nation building processes, due to more than half a century of foreign 
domination and repressed national aspirations. In South Eastern Europe, the traditional 
concepts still prevail. This gap has significant policy repercussions for BiH and has 
caused grave misperceptions in the EU about developments in SEE region. 
C. STATE WEAKNESS AND FAILURE 
Following the end of the Cold War, the gravest dangers to world security are no 
longer arising from rivaling great powers, but from the world’s most poorly governed 
countries, from weak or failing states. Within a very short timeframe, failed and failing 
states made an astonishing odyssey from the periphery to the very heart of global politics. 
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As far as the capabilities of states are concerned, a large body of literature has 
emerged to identify the strength of a state. Fukuyama contends that “the strength of the 
state is the ability of states to plan and execute policies, and to enforce laws cleanly and 
transparently – what is commonly referred to as state or institutional capacity. States need 
to provide public order and defense from external invasion before they provide universal 
health insurance or free higher education. Strength includes the ability to enact statutes 
and to frame and execute policies; to administer the public business with relative 
efficiency; to control graft, corruption, and bribery, to maintain high levels of 
transparency and accountability in governmental institutions; and most importantly to 
enforce laws,”39 which is part of “good governance.” 
Academics and policy-makers elaborated equally on the converse: weak, failing 
and failed states, because it has become widely accepted in the contemporary world that 
one of the gravest dangers to international security is emanating from these states. They 
are “often marred by serious internal conflict that also has the potential of destabilizing 
neighboring states and providing ungoverned territory that can provide safe haven for 
terrorists, for drug production, for trafficking, for other global crime and breed 
instability.”40 Besides, weak states have always been the hothouse of ethnic, religious, or 
other inter-communal strives. Scholars tend to agree on the definition of the weak/failing 
state: “The state is no longer able to meet its end of the social contract. It cannot 
consistently provide for safety and security of its citizens.”41 According to Zartman “the 
basic functions of the state are no longer performed, and the state can no longer perform 
the functions required for them to pass as a state.”42 However, there is no common 
agreement about the relevant (capacities and/or) indicators to measure state strength. 
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Stewart Patrick argues that “state strength is relative and can be measured by the state’s 
ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods associated with 
statehood. Those indicators are: physical security, legitimate political institutions, 
economic management, and social welfare.”43 According to Robert Dorff, “state 
weakness is not just a question of capacity but also of will (examples of corrupt, 
incompetent, or venal regimes), where the problem is the use of political power for evil 
or selfish purposes.”44The Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and 
Foreign Policy has conducted a global ranking of weak and failing states. According to 
their definition, “a failing state is one in which the government does not have effective 
control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its 
population, does not provide domestic security as basic public services to its citizens, and 
lacks a monopoly on the use of force.”45  
Thus, a state can be qualified as a weak state, when its legitimacy is seriously in 
crisis, there is political instability, lack of national identity, institutional weakness. 
According to Richard Jackson “the legitimacy crisis is expressed through very low 
political participation rates (and correspondingly high levels of disengagement or ‘exit’ 
by significant sectors of the population, such as peasants), a reliance on coercion to 
ensure compliance, unstable politics (e.g., governmental crises, coups, plots, riots, 
rebellions), severe social cleavages (ethnic, religious, or class), and the centralization of 
power in a ruling elite, usually focused on a single leader or political party. Besides, weak 
states invariably lack cohesive national identities.”46 Furthermore, the political party 
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system has, according to Sumantra Bose, a pivotal importance in the democratization 
process, because “a multi-party system is the bedrock institution of any democratic 
polity, and the primary mechanism for both representation of citizens and mediation of 
differences between citizens, and groups of citizens.”47 Bose argues, that 
“The structure of the party system thus has a crucial bearing on the level of 
‘integration’ that can be achieved in any society… It also influences the degree of 
centripetal integration that can be engineered in divided multiethnic societies via 
deliberate design of electoral rules and methods.”48 
Among the many factors of state weakness the most alarming sign is when the 
state does not have full control over the armed forces. A state has to retain primacy in 
ensuring security—both externally and internally—of the population, and should not let 
alternatives take over this responsibility. Michael Brzoska argues that “post-conflict 
situations are typically marked by major inadequacies in providing physical security. 
Typical examples of insecurity include organized crime and illegal paramilitary 
organizations, trafficking in drugs and weapons, the unregulated possession of firearms, 
terrorism and violent extremism and the abuse of power by state security apparatuses.”49 
This is in line with what Fukuyama argues, “at the core of state-building is the creation of 
a government that has a monopoly of legitimate power and that is capable of enforcing 
rules throughout the state’s territory. That is why state-building always begins with the 
creation of military and police forces or the conversion of the former regime’s coercive 
agencies into new ones.”50 
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D. FACTORS UNDERMINING STATE VIABILITY 
1. Implications of Consociational Power Sharing 
Post-conflict peace-building refers to the aspiration of the international 
community to build a peaceful, self-sustaining, viable state from the ashes of war. This 
process mobilizes a concomitant plethora of international agents, both governmental and 
non-governmental organizations. Following conflicts in the contemporary world, the 
international community invests enormous resources, both human and economic, into 
peace settlements and establishing sustainable peace in conflict regions. The huge 
material and human costs of a failed “peace effort,” the consolidation of conflict 
settlement and dealing with threats to peace building are critical challenges for the 
international community. 
In post-conflict, deeply divided societies both the international community and 
the state itself have to face the challenge of establishing and maintaining democracy and 
state viability. In the late 1960s Arend Lijphart developed the theory of consociational 
democracy in an innovative way, arguing that the type of democracy which is most likely 
to have a positive effect on lasting peace is consociational, power-sharing democracy. 
According to Lijphart, “a society characterized by sharp cleavages and with few 
overlapping memberships needs a radically different political system than societies with 
crosscutting cleavages and overlapping loyalty. A post-conflict society with high levels 
of distrust and suspicion between the parties, and extensive security challenges, can reach 
a stable peace if its political institutions are shaped as in the consociational 
democracy.”51 Thus, the emphasis has been on sharing the power rather than on 
monopolizing it. 
Pippa Norris refers to Lijphart arguing that “a consociational democracy is a type 
of democracy which emphasizes the importance of power-sharing among different 
segments in a divided society, providing primacy to collectivities rather than individuals. 
Power-sharing institutions facilitate accommodation and cooperation among leadership 
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elites, making them most suitable for states struggling to achieve stable democracy and 
good governance in divided societies.”52 Sumantra Bose emphasizes the significance of 
consociationalism since “policy-making procedures are oriented to broadly based 
agreement across groups, in contrast to the majoritarian mechanism conventionally used 
in non-consociational democracies.”53 
In deeply divided societies, power sharing institutions include diverse societal 
groups in the governing process, encouraging them to cooperate in favor of common 
political goals, and avoiding the traditional majority rule of democracies which leaves 
little chance for opposition to influence political output. Sherrill Stroschein argues that “it 
is often conceived as a system to ensure group security in a multiethnic society. This 
system of governance seeks to include all segments of a diverse society in a decision-
making process that aims for the broadest possible consensus.”54 Consociational models 
are a form of consensus democracy which requires that the major sub-groups of the 
society (usually defined along ethnic, sectarian or communitarian lines) rule the state 
jointly, making decisions through some form of consensus mechanism.55 A number of 
specific examples might be cited in support of this proposition, one of the best known of 
which is Lebanon as an extreme example of a state debilitated by primordial ethnic 
cleavages.56 
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However, there are several drawbacks as concerns the long-term effects of 
consociational power-sharing. Samuels argues that “power-sharing arrangements are 
often the result of agreements between elites over access to power and resources, not real 
attempts to resolve divisions between ethnic communities. In many cases, the formal 
organization of power along identity or ethnic lines seems to entrench the divisions that 
fueled the conflict, rather than ameliorate them, and divisions appear to become 
radicalized during the power-sharing phase.”57 In addition, Bose believes that there are 
serious risks in consociationalism, because “consociationalism does recognize some 
collective identities to the exclusion of others, and it does institutionally entrench those 
cleavages…thus causing fragmentation of social and political life into enclaves.”58 The 
most effective criticism of the consociational paradigm is that it fails to “recognize the 
variability of ethnic identities, and the pervasiveness of intra-ethnic cleavages in most 
societies.”59 Thus, this system is not only inherently undemocratic, but underestimates 
the possibilities to overcome ethnic cleavages in favor of renewed unity. 
In heterogenous societies, where ethnic segmental cleavages exist, members will 
turn their loyalty on all or most aspects towards one particular group. Besides, the once 
belligerent groups face the security dilemma, which is best defined by Jack Snyder and 
Robert Jervis as “a situation in which each party’s efforts to increase its own security 
reduce the security of others.”60 
The theory of consociational democracy is based on the assumption that 
successful accommodation of ethnic differences is possible only through inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation in institutions that explicitly recognize the ethnic divisions and make them 
the basis of the rules for decision-making, territorial division of power and public 
policies. It guarantees the protection of group rights and recognizes the legitimacy of 
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claims to national self-determination within the existing state. Consociationalism is 
conceived to produce, in an innovative way, a stable political system, stabilizing 
democracy due to elite cooperation despite social segmentation even in deeply divided 
societies.61 
As it has already been argued, in power sharing arrangements representatives are 
supposed to represent their respective communities and any dilution of this principle 
might undermine their legitimacy and ability to negotiate with other groups’ 
representatives on behalf of the group. The elected leaders might be more moderate than 
representatives who are selected on a purely mono-ethnic basis. In the case of Bosnia, the 
institutionalization of ethnicity was the most peculiar to the post-conflict agreement. The 
power-sharing system of Bosnia and Herzegovina was institutionalized in the DPA, 
including guaranteed representation for all three ethnic groups in Parliament and 
government, substantial autonomy through the two Entities (RS and FBiH) and far-
reaching veto rights. At the same time, power-sharing in Bosnia has been constrained by 
both the strong role of the international community, which is interested in having a viable 
central state. The state level—where power-sharing takes place—has remained without 
substantial power. 
The constitution recognizes ‘citizens’ as a quasi-separate group from the three 
national groups, while the institutional—just as the political and social-reality ignores the 
existence of other minorities, citizens of mixed marriages, and those not willing or able to 
identify with the national groups.62 The overall emphasis of ethnic belonging in the 
executive and legislature of Bosnia does ensure a permanent grand coalition of the three 
national groups. At the same time, the over-institutionalization provides little flexibility 
in the executive power-sharing.63 
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According to Florian Bieber’s analysis, “in Bosnia, the Presidency members have 
been generally regarded as legitimate leaders of their respective nation, mostly because 
they did not moderate their platform to garner minority support. Instead, the past 
elections to the Presidency have de facto deprived a segment of the population from 
representation in the Presidency. Serbs from the Federation and Bosniaks and Croats in 
the Republika Srpska have thus had no representation of their own in the Presidency. 
Rather, they have had to rely on the—frequently inadequate-representation by members 
of their nation from the other entity.”64  
In scholarly circles the skepticism as concerns power-sharing has grown 
following the plethora of different post-conflict arrangements in the last few decades. 
Matthijs Bogaards argues that “the limits to mass participation and elite contestation lead 
critics to regard power-sharing as a form of ‘constrained democracy.’ Power-sharing 
thereby comes at the expense of democracy.” He adds that “consociational democracy 
reinforces social divisions instead of breaking them down, at least in the short term.”65 
Further, Roy Licklider argues that “power sharing is not necessarily democratic; in fact, it 
is often designed precisely to prevent simple majorities from ruling. More significantly, it 
can take place among elites with very little role for other segments of the society.”66 
At the elite level, consociational practices reward communal politicians, giving 
them incentives to continue to play the ethnic, religious, linguistic or racial card and 
hindering the emergence of cross-communal parties and a different kind of politics. 
While successfully implemented power sharing systems decrease group status concerns 
and increase incentives for groups to cooperate with each other, power sharing systems 
based on ethnicity also magnify the salience of communal identity, making it harder to 
create cross-cutting ties, thus cementing the cleavages between the different ethnic 
groups.  
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The Dayton Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has put 
into place elaborate power-sharing arrangements that are coming under increasing 
criticism for their failure to ease tensions and promote cross-ethnic politics.67 Therefore, 
consociational democracy is increasingly seen as a short-term solution to be followed by 
other, presumably more democratic and lasting arrangements. The 1995 Dayton 
agreement preserved the Bosnian state by creating a consociational confederation of two 
radically autonomous ‘Entities’ and three peoples, with a complicated system of power-
sharing structures to be overseen by an international governor with wide-ranging 
authority.68 Dayton established a tri-national state that grants Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs 
equal protection and ensures political representation and power on the basis of the 
groups’ numerical strength. Thus, the executive body of the Bosnian government requires 
the participation of all three nationalities. However, the power-sharing in Bosnia is rather 
perceived as being ‘imported’ than a result of the will of the polity, or at least of the 
political representatives of national groups, because the Dayton Agreement represented 
none of the parties’ preferred outcome. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the principal instrument 
of group inclusion are two-chamber parliaments, where the upper houses at state and 
entity levels have numerically defined numbers of seats reserved for all groups: parity at 
the state-level and a distribution in the entities based on the 1991 population. The lower 
houses of parliament have minimum seat requirements in the entities and an entity-
specific seat division at the state level. All cases have some type of veto mechanism that 
ensures that non-dominant groups cannot be outvoted.69 
2. Spoilers 
According to Stephen John Stedman, “cases of peace implementation differ in 
two important respects—difficulty of the implementation environment and the 
willingness of states to provide resources and risk troops—and that these differences are 
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predictable before implementation begins. Three factors are most commonly associated 
with a difficult environment: spoilers—leaders or factions hostile to a peace agreement 
and willing to use violence to undermine it; neighboring states that are hostile to the 
agreement; and spoils—valuable, easily tradeable commodities.”70 
Inevitably, the international community has to face different factors, which try to 
undermine and delay all its efforts of peace building through a variety of means and for 
an array of motives. With the words of Stephen John Stedman, “when international actors 
lack unity…spoilers can take advantage of international splits to attack the peace process 
and threaten the peacemakers.71 “Spoilers” are actors willing to use violence to actively 
hinder or obstruct conflict resolution. They pose threats not only to security, but to the 
whole state building process. Those spoilers can not only be individuals, or insurgents, 
but even governments and other entities such as ethnic or national diaspora groups or 
parties, political allies, who benefit from violent conflict. Spoilers are intrinsically 
destabilizing. Edward Newman contends that “at the core of this broad definition are the 
activities of any actors that are opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason. These 
actors are either within or (usually) outside the ‘peace process,’ and use violence or other 
means to disrupt the process in pursuit of their aims. Parties that join a peace process but 
then withdraw and obstruct, or threaten to obstruct, the process may also be termed 
spoilers. Similarly, there are parties that are a part of the peace process but which are not 
seriously interested in making compromises or in committing to a peaceful endgame.” 72 
The presence of spoilers in peace processes creates daunting challenges to 
implementation. There can be several problems with spoilers. The first is that spoilers are 
often recognized only after the fact. According to Stedman, “this criticism can be 
addressed by attempting to gauge whether implementers judged that they were likely to 
face violent challenges during implementation. A more sophisticated criticism of the 
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spoiler concept is that potential spoilers are always present and whether or not an actor 
actually assumes this role depends on the existence of a special opportunity structure.”73 
Further, Newman’s inside-outside view on spoilers tries to understand the 
dynamics of the conflict from the point of view of disputants, suggesting that what an 
outsider sees as spoiling may be viewed by insiders as a legitimate attempt to shape the 
process or end it if it does not offer a potential for a satisfactory outcome in their eyes.74. 
There are cases, when the participating parties are not interested in the peace process and 
try to expand political debate by artificially establishing a hostile environment. Bruce D. 
Jones argues that, “to do so, they will exploit divisions among mediators and 
implementers, and take maximum advantage of any confusion or disagreement between 
various implementing agencies. Strategic coordination becomes a critical element of the 
capacity of implementers to stave off opposition.”75 
According to Stedman, “The implementers did not anticipate the possibility of 
political spoiling of the agreement, and rested their civilian strategy on rapid elections 
and multiethnic institutions that would tame the ethnic statelets. When the rapid elections, 
a prerequisite for U.S. participation in implementation, consolidated the power of the 
ethnic extremists who had led the war, the door was open to widespread political spoiling 
of the agreement: the continuing appeal to ethnic extremism and exclusion as a basis for 
political support, the use of police as a means of rendering ethnic and political 
adversaries insecure, refusal of local authorities to allow freedom of movement or 
repatriation of other ethnic groups to their areas, the collusion of political authorities in 
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informal, corrupt economic activities, and general foot-dragging by elected authorities in 
creating and then working with multiethnic institutions.”76 
3. The Ethnic Element 
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist regimes, 
the states in Central and Eastern Europe remained weak and many unable to manage 
necessary reforms. The political landscape of the Balkans proves that ethnic issues play a 
pivotal role in the security of the region. 
The concept of ethnicity and ethnic group has been the subject of various 
definitions and interpretations. For Jowitt, ethnicity “is a remarkable and recent form of 
attempted group security, dignified identity, and material advantage peculiar to 
egalitarian settings. Ethnicity is a mode of identification.”77 Numerous scholars argue 
that an ethnic group or community is commonly defined as historically generated or 
rediscovered communities of people that largely reproduce themselves. An ethnic or 
communal group has a distinct name, which often simply signifies person or people in the 
ethnic community’s language, a specific heterogeneous culture, particularly, a distinct 
language, and a collective memory or historical remembrance, including community 
myths. This is producing a degree of solidarity among members, generating a feeling of 
belonging and common origin. Ethnicity as a term is used to describe a variety of forms 
of mobilization, which ultimately relate to the autonomous existence of specifically 
ethnic forms of socialization.78 D. Horowitz refers to the minimal definition of ethnic unit 
by contending that “an ethnic unit is the idea of common provenance, recruitment 
primarily through kinship, and a notion of distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a 
unique inventory of cultural traits and that so that ethnic membership transcends the 
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range of face-to-face interactions, as recognized kinship need not. So conceived, ethnicity 
easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers tribes, 
races, nationalities, and castes.”79 
Ethnic conflict is mostly internal (intra-state) conflict among various ethnic 
groups. Kaufmann defines ethnic conflicts as “disputes between communities which see 
themselves as having distinct heritages, over the power relationship between the 
communities.”80 Klaus Eder claims that “there is a general process underlying ethnic 
conflictualization, which is the construction of symbolic boundaries and the generation of 
a collective identity. Regardless of whether we focus on ethnic mobilization, claims 
making of nationalist or regionalist groups, or forms of xenophobic action, they all are 
based on a specific coding of collective identity and struggles over these boundary 
markers. Ethnicity is a script for collective action that becomes crucial in certain 
circumstances.”81 Further, he contends that a distinct language, religious cleavages, class, 
mobility, international context and backing by a foreign state, territoriality, and unequal 
citizenship are equally responsible for the emergence of ethnic conflicts. He argues that 
“when the process of ethnic identicization sweeps across a society, the human events 
appear as thousands of separate dramas. Hundreds of subtle exclusions, dozens of sneaky 
jokes, thousands of hopes raised hundreds of pairs of eyes lowered. Broken friendships, 
cancelled marriages, estranged friends. New alliances, new collectivities are engaging in 
new projects. These separate human dramas unfold in an endless series of events: 
decisions to tell a particular joke, to make a divisive political speech, to work for the 
good of a given public, or to admit that an interethnic marriage has become 
unworkable.”82 
C. Scherrer differentiates four different types of ethnic conflicts. He argues that 
one type of ethnic conflict is the interethnic conflict, which, however, does not really 
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challenge the state since the state is mostly not a party to it. Similarly, gang wars and 
warlordism, which can also be ethnic but account for a limited number of conflicts, are 
structurally different from the higher number of interethnic or communal conflicts; both 
subspecies of ethnic conflicts, again, are very different from the higher ethno-nationalist 
conflicts, which are also recruited among disadvantaged ethnic groups; but their political 
configuration has much more in common with the type of anti-regime conflict. All of 
these three types are very different from a fourth type of ethnic conflict, which is entirely 
state organized and chooses members of a particular racial, national or ethnic group as 
victim. The lethality of this ultimate form of mass violence is the highest of all.83 
Violent ethnic conflict is pending when a particular set of factors and conditions 
converge. These factors are ethnic motions (stemming from the historical memories of 
grievances), a structural crisis, political entrepreneurs, and competition over resources. 
The majority of the existing literature offers four different approaches to the origin of 
ethnic strife in a country. In situations where ethnic emotions, stemming from the 
memories of grievances, are deep and historically rooted, they are primordial. With the 
words of Anthony Oberschall, “in the primordial view, ethnic attachments and identities 
are a cultural given and a natural affinity, like kinship sentiments. They have an 
overpowering emotional and non-rational quality. Applied to the former Yugoslavia, the 
primordialist (e.g., Kaplan, Balkan Ghost, 1993) believes that despite seemingly 
cooperative relations between nationalities in Yugoslavia, mistrust, enmity, and even 
hatred were just below the surface, as had always been true in the Balkans. Triggered by 
fierce competition for political power during the breakup of Yugoslavia and driven by the 
uncertainties over state boundaries and minority status, these enmities and ancient 
hatreds, fueled by fear and retribution, were activated and turned neighbor against 
neighbor and district against district in an expanding spiral of aggression and reprisal.”84 
Although the primordial account sounds plausible, much evidence on the 
nationalities in Yugoslavia and on the Bosnian civil war contradicts it. The claim of long 
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existing ethnic conflict between ethnicities in Yugoslavia is not supported by evidence, 
because Yugoslavia never saw the kind of religious wars Western and Central Europe 
experienced, and “Serbs and Croats fought each other very little before this 
century….Contemporary ethnic violence stems as much from deliberate government 
policies as from traditional communal antagonism.”85 Moreover, intermarriage rates were 
quite high in those ethnically mixed regions that saw the worst violence in the 1990s. 
Therefore, the instrumentalist view holds that ethnic sentiments and loyalties are 
manipulated by political leaders and intellectuals for political ends, such as state creation. 
For the former Yugoslavia the instrumentalist explanation highlights the Serb 
nationalists’ goal of Greater Serbia and a similar Croat nationalism in Croatia.86 
The constructivist view supplements the insights of the primordial and of the 
instrumentalist views. Religion and ethnicity are very real social facts, but in ordinary 
times they are only one of several roles and identities that matter. Ethnic and religious 
issues can be manipulated by politicians and intellectuals to spread fear and insecurity. 
Yet the outcome is not inevitable. The constructivist view has to be complemented with a 
model of ethnic polarization and conflict escalation and the parallel failure of conflict 
resolution.  
Accordingly, the violent conflict in Yugoslavia can be explained by ethnic 
cleavages being provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where 
ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. Much speaks for this constructivist 
interpretation. 87 The population, especially in ethnically-mixed regions, did not want 
war; violence was imposed from outside. The conflict took place along ethnic lines. But 
the main cause was not ancient hatreds, but rather the purposeful actions of political 
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actors who actively created violent conflict, selectively drawing on history in order to 
portray it as historically inevitable.88 For example, the Bosnian government, almost 
defenseless, desperately sought to stay out of the widening conflict. But in spring 1992, 
Milosevic - in alliance with Radovan Karadzic’s breakaway Bosnian Serbs - launched the 
genocidal “ethnic cleansing” of those parts of Bosnia earmarked for “Greater Serbia.”89 
Another example is that “in Vukovar, Serbs attacked not only local Croats, but also 
Serbs, while Croats who fled the fighting in that city often gave their house keys not to 
the local Croatian police, whom they did not know, but to their Serbian neighbors.”90 
This top-down approach of ethnic mobilization was reflected in the stereotyping 
rhetoric of the nationalist political elites. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, 
nationalist Serb leaders portrayed the Serb population as the people “who have the talent, 
energy, experience, and tradition to form a state,” they characterized their adversaries as 
representing “all that is base, undesirable, and naturally subordinate. At the same time, 
however, Serb opinion makers have portrayed their people as maligned, cheated, and 
threatened. Moreover, Serbian spokesmen painted their people not only as non-
threatening to anyone else but, on the contrary, as the target of threats emanating from all 
of Yugoslavia’s other communities.”91 
In spite of the fact that the constructivist view offers useful insights, it is still 
incomplete. The top-down interpretation needs to be merged with a bottom-up 
interpretation which centers on uncertainty and fear that are driven by the security 
dilemma in ethnic conflicts. State breakdown and anarchy are often the result of a lack of 
trust generated by a security dilemma that arises in ethnic conflicts. Uncertainty over the 
intentions of other ethnic groups motivates defensive arming to protect their own lives 
and property against ethnic rivals, which then vice versa stimulates arming by other 
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ethnic groups. The result is a spiral of ethnic mobilization, driven like an arms race 
between states.92 Thus, the driving force is not ethnic hatred but fear and insecurity, 
which is a strong bottom-up element. E. Melander contends that “defensively motivated 
actors, through efforts to enhance their own security, may provoke fear and 
countermeasures, with the result that less rather than more security is obtained in the 
end.”93 Bringing these factors together, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that 
“intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. As groups 
begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise 
that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, 
problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become 
apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. Ethnic activists and 
political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and 
polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving 
groups further apart. Together, these between-group and within-group strategic 
interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that can explode into 
murderous violence.”94 
Ethnic conflict of this sort necessarily undermines state viability. It is particularly 
troubling in states that are already weak. The result is often state failure, even anarchy. 
Lake and Rothchild observe: “Anarchy may arise within states between hostile or 
distrustful ethnic groups when the ability or willingness of the state to provide protection 
is being questioned. It can be argued that this is especially likely to happen when 
societies undergo political transitions.”95 This was the case both for Yugoslavia from 
1986 to 1991 and for Bosnia in 1991/2. Michael Ignatieff analyzed the ethnic rationale 
unfolding in such situations: “Once the Yugoslav communist state began to split into its 
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constituent national particles the key question soon became: will the local Croat 
policeman protect me if I am a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new 
boss is a Serb or a Muslim? The answer to this question was no, because no state 
remained to enforce the old ethnic bargain.”96 
State weakness and ethnic conflict thus create a vicious cycle. The weaker the 
state, the more ethnic conflict can spread; and the more intense the ethnic conflict, the 
more endangered the state. In weak states, ethnic political elites can manipulate group 
fears and identities. They can “produce a rapid process of social polarization that 
magnifies hostility and fear among groups. As polarization proceeds, members of an 
ethnic group are pressured by their leaders—and by the reciprocal intensification of 
hostility in the other group—to identify only with their ethnic group and to break any 
crosscutting ties.”97 Ethnic groups thus change their perception of out-groups. Intolerance 
increases as a result of the conflict, rather than precipitating it. Even after a peace 
settlement, the state remains weak and the different ethnic groups remain distant from 
each other for a long period of time. 
Thus, the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach need to be combined to 
grasp the essence of ethnic conflict. Both have to be combined to explain state weakness 
in BiH. These approaches have a bi-directional causality: Ethnic leaders can stir up a 
receptive ethnicity (as Milosevic did), which can then itself pressure leaders to take 
radical measures/stances. The result is a weakening of the common state structure in 
favor of fractionation. Vice versa, if ethnic conflicts are low like in Western Europe, 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The investigation of different conceptions of the state revealed that there is a 
concomitant plethora of approaches to the concept of the state. While the perception of 
the state has enormously changed in Western Europe, a more traditional view of the state 
still prevails in the Western Balkan region. 
The main indicators of state viability are several. A state still needs to possess the 
main (Westphalian) attributes; thus, it must control its territory, maintain the monopoly 
on the use of force, be able to provide basic public services and deliver essential political 
goods (most importantly security) to all of its population (regardless of ethnicity), be 
regarded as legitimate by the majority of the population (representative, regardless of 
ethnicity), and be seen as a viable representative on the world stage. In ethnically divided 
societies the monopoly on the use of armed forces (police and military) has a particularly 
strong causal effect on state viability. Ethnic division causes military division, i.e., the 
creation of separate militias for each ethnie. This is an expression of the fact that the 
primary loyalty is with the ethnie, not the common state, which thus lacks legitimacy. 
The most visible signal of a state’s legitimacy is the level of political participation of the 
society. Both the political participation and the party system are closely connected to free 
and fair elections, without which democracy is seriously in danger. 
On the other hand, numerous dangers prey upon the state-building efforts of the 
international community in a post-conflict environment. Imposed power-sharing systems 
serve their good only in a short-term perspective, because in deeply divided societies 
consociational power-sharing cements ethnic cleavages rather than promotes 
reconciliation and multi-ethnicity. Besides, spoilers, hidden or not, can undermine state-
building processes and undermine state viability. 
The chapter further explored that ethnic conflict is caused by an amalgamation of 
several factors ranging from grievances, structural crises, manipulation of political elites 
and most importantly by a lack of trust due to the security dilemma. The relationship 
between state failure/weakness and ethnic conflict is not a one-way street. The 
relationship is in many cases circular, with the top-down and bottom-up causalities 
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feeding upon each other. State weakness provides the political space for the 
intensification of conflicts among ethnic groups, and ethnic conflict in turn further erodes 
and undermines the viability of a state. Suffering from acute insecurity, individuals often 
turn to political factions, ethnic groups, or even criminal gangs to provide them with 
protection in exchange for their loyalty and contribution—financial, physical, or both—to 
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III. FROM ASHES TO VIABILITY–ASSESSING THE STATE OF 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
The wise politics of peace conducted by Slobodan Milosevic since the 
very beginning of the war has finally triumphed.98 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will test empirically the propositions of the previous theoretical 
chapter. By introducing the Dayton Peace Accord it will provide insights into the 
dilemmas and difficulties both the International Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had to face after the devastating three and a half year long war. The DPA was not just a 
single treaty; its importance stretches much farther: the Bosnian post-conflict state-
building endeavor has served as a primary lesson learned by the international community, 
and it has established the longest peace-keeping operation since the end of the cold war. 
The chapter will scrutinize both the military and the civilian implementation of 
the DPA. It will pay special attention to the criteria posed to state viability. Thus, it will 
more deeply investigate those attributes of a state, which have pivotal importance for 
state viability. The investigation of the civilian implementation of the DPA will be 
devoted to stateness, political participation, political and social integration, to stability of 
democratic institutions and to international cooperation. 
B. THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS (DPA) 
The fratricidal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 was the 
third, and at the same time the most brutal chapter of the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia. The war left the country devastated and deeply divided along ethnic lines. 
Ethnic cleansing, massive expulsion of Muslims and Croats, massacres, rape and tortures 
were appalling features of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) during that period. After 
three and a half years of devastating war, Bosnia has had to tackle a triple transition 
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process: “first, transition from war to peace; second, transition from socialist economy to 
a market economy; and finally from a dependent country to a self-sustaining state.”99 
Pursuant to the impotence of the International Community to stop the fighting 
along ethnic cleavages, and following the fact that the humanitarian and political 
consequences of the war had finally become unbearable to international observers, a 
delicate and complicated compromise was reached in the Dayton Peace Accords, which 
is less a prototype on “(How) To End a War”100 than “a terrible way to end a terrible 
war.”101 The DPA is a unique peace settlement because “a traditional peace treaty aims at 
ending a war between nations and coalitions of nations, while here it is a question of 
setting up a state on the basis of little more than the ruins and rivalries of a bitter war.”102 
Dayton is a complex blueprint for reconstruction of a country, not a simple treaty. The 
negotiations, “in a three weeks long quarantine until an agreement had been hammered 
out,”103 took place in Dayton, Ohio, U.S. in November 1995, and were finally signed in 
Paris on 14 December 1995 with U.S. leadership. 
As far as the United Nations is concerned—during the preparation of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it can be concluded that the 
UN was not given a significant role in BiH mainly because the Clinton Administration 
did not wish it so, due to the inadequacies of both UN diplomacy (International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia) and peacekeeping/peacemaking (UNPROFOR) 
during the war. The UN was also largely side-stepped in the final stages of peace 
negotiations by the Contact Group. In the words of Wallander, Celeste and Keohane, “the 
ineffectiveness of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia should remind us that, when there is a 
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mismatch between institutional capabilities and the mission to be performed, reliance on 
an international organization can be a recipe for disaster.”104 
 
Figure 1.   Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic composition before the war (as of 1991)105 
 
The first and central task of Dayton implementation lay in the field of security. 
The war left Bosnia with two broad security challenges: first, to ensure that the parties 
would not relapse into war; second, to extend the cease-fire to civilians and ensure that 
they were no longer targets of organized violence. Both security considerations had in 
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some fashion to embrace the full spectrum of potential belligerents, or what Dayton 
labeled “all personnel and organizations with military capability.” This included 
reservists, national guards, military police, internal security forces, and armed civilian 
groups as well as the “foreign forces” that were to be withdrawn within thirty days after 
the peace accord was signed. The parties were obliged to conduct law enforcement “in 
accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.”106 
The DPA contained considerable compromise, not only for the warring parties 
inside BiH, but also for the International Community. As a result of the bad experience 
with the UN-NATO “dual-key arrangements” concerning NATO air strikes during the 
war, the IFOR military commander was given full authority to do whatever he considered 
necessary to create and maintain a safe and secure environment. The civilian 
implementers had no authority to task or to veto the military commander. It was also 
significant that it was the commander on the ground inside BiH who decided what 
constituted non-compliance, not SACEUR or the NATO Council in Mons. The military 
tasks were concentrated in just two annexes, while the civilian tasks were shared among 
at least four principal players in no less than ten annexes. 
The vast majority of scholars and political observers in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
agree with David Chandler’s position arguing that “the Dayton Peace Accord offered an 
agenda for peace, ended the war, not a finished architecture.”107 The DPA provided both 
the structural and the institutional framework for the reconstruction of BiH consisting of 
eleven Annexes, in which Annexes 1-A and 1-B comprise the detailed military aspects. 
The institutional framework of the post-war Bosnian state established by the DPA is a 
consociational settlement. According to Sumantra Bose “consociational rules and norms 
are built into practically every aspect and every level of the Dayton system. The state is 
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constructed as an essentially confederal union between two Entities, a power-sharing 
federation based on equality and parity for the federating national segments and a 
radically autonomous Republika Srpska.”108 
The most remarkable aspect of the accords was the sharp division of labor 
between military and civilian implementation, the former led by NATO and the latter by 
the UN sponsored High Representative charged with overseeing civilian implementation. 
Thus, from the beginning a dualistic, potentially rivalrous structure of implementation 
was set up. The new position of High Representative (HR), which became the most 
visible international institution in BiH, as the final authority regarding interpretation of 
the DPA on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement was established by 
Annex 10 of the DPA and has been supported by the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR). Thus, an inter-institutional institution was set up to coordinate the different 
players in Sarajevo and to increase coherence and guidance. The HR was to be appointed 
always by the Europeans, in contrast to the NATO commander. The High Representative 
is appointed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board and endorsed by 
the UN Security Council.109 Following several political scandals and artificially built 
hurdles in the way of democratization by the ethnic nationalist elites, two years later, “at 
a PIC meeting in Bonn, in the face of political obstruction, the powers of the High 
Representative were extended to include the ability to dismiss or suspend officials for 
‘Anti-Dayton activities,’ and impose legislation. These became known as the Bonn 
Powers.”110 Thus, the mandate of the HR was significantly expanded, which then became 
a model for civil implementation in Kosovo two years later. 
The Dayton Peace Accords, which is basically a peace treaty, represents the 
negotiated framework of the termination of the conflict in that it brought peace to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties agreed to respect each 
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others' sovereignty, maintain a cease-fire in Bosnia, withdraw military forces to agreed 
lines of separation, approve a new constitution and hold presidential and legislative 
elections.111 The Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat communities did neither negotiate nor 
sign the agreement, since their territories were not internationally recognized and their 
leaders were awaiting trial in the International War Crimes Tribunal. Only their deputies 
were able to attend Dayton as observers. Instead, the agreement was signed by the 
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, by the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and by 
the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. This was highly consequential. First, it 
implied that Milosevic would be able to gain approval of the Serb leadership in Bosnia 
and in Croatia for the Dayton Accords – which he did within a few days. The critical 
question though arose whether he would also be able to guarantee the implementation of 
the agreement in good faith since the Bosnian and Croat Serbs were the losers of Dayton 
and were supposed to do everything to spoil its implementation. Second, Milosevic and 
Tudjman were thus given the opportunity, albeit grudgingly, to portray themselves as the 
guarantors of peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than as key players 
in, and sponsors of, the conflict during the previous three-and-a-half years.112 Milosevic, 
being the President of only one republic (besides Montenegro) of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), thereby also represented his entire country, and this at a time when 
that country was still not even internationally recognized.  
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Figure 2.   International Organizations Responsible for Implementation of Dayton Peace Accords in 1996113 
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The Accords are composed of two distinct parts. The very first and most 
important part of the DPA consists of ending the conflict itself, namely, “ending the 
fighting, putting down the weapons and separating forces.”114 However, this step was 
only the first rung on the ladder in creating a long lasting peace, because, as Francine 
Friedman argues, “stopping the fighting is a separate operation from making peace, 
removing the incentive for re-engaging in war, and making the peace self-supporting. 
These latter steps involve permanently stopping the war by changing the critical 
expectation that the war could resume.”115  
The second but seemingly much more difficult mission the International 
Community has had to face has been understood as the point of departure to devise a 
functioning, viable state and assuring a lasting future of a common state for its citizens. 
This, however, constitutes a pending issue even today. 
To accomplish the first, the military part of the Agreement, it elaborated a very 
detailed schedule for separating and drawing down the belligerent forces of the Bosnian 
Serbs, on the one side, and the Bosniak-Croat Federation, on the other. In contrary, on the 
civilian part the only scheduled deadline was to have national elections within nine 
months. The mission of the civilian aspects of the DPA, according to Elizabeth M. 
Cousens, “included a postwar constitution and a wide range of provisions to deal with 
such varied aspects as refugee repatriation, elections and democratization, human rights, 
and reunification.116 
The 1995 Dayton agreement preserved the Bosnian state by creating a 
consociational confederation of two radically autonomous ‘Entities’ and three peoples, 
with a complicated system of power-sharing structures to be overseen by an international 
governor with wide-ranging authority.117 It divided the country into ethnonationalist 
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homelands, i.e., two entities, the first one populated by Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats, 
the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and the second populated by Serbs, the 
Republika Srpska (RS), “each with its own president, government, parliament, police and 
other bodies, …and as a state of three constituent peoples – Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs 
and Croats.”118 Cousens adds that “Bosnian Serbs got a demographically sweet deal (49 
percent of Bosnia territory when they represented only 31 percent of the prewar 
population) on the one hand, but a territorially disappointing one on the other”119 since 
their territory was split in two halves and connected only by a small strip of land, the 
Brcko corridor was under separate international administration.  
The state has been exceptionally unbalanced and complex, due to the “not less 
than five different levels of administration, taking into account the state, the two entities, 
the ten cantons of the Federation and the municipalities, as well as the district of 
Brcko.”120 The Republika Srpska maintains a highly centralized structure where the 
entity government directly oversees the municipalities. Thus, relations between the RS 
and the Federation, already colored by ethnic tensions, are further complicated by 
asymmetrical governmental structures. The consequence was that “the lack of political 
will and acts of blatant obstructionism on the part of elected officials have left Bosnia at 
times with little more than the trappings of state.”121 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had three armies, three police forces, three intelligence 
services, and no central government worthy of the name.122 According to Paddy 
Ashdown, High Representative from May 2002 to January 2006, the situation had been  
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made even more complicated because “Bosnia had no less than 1,200 judges and 
prosecutors, 760 legislators, 180 Ministers, four governments and three armies and 13 
Prime Ministers in May 2002.”123  
 
Figure 3.   Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic composition in 1998124 
 
Despite the best intentions of the international community, the cost of achieving 
peace was the creation of the strong ethnically defined entities and a weak central 
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administration.125 The political system has been unusually decentralized, divided along 
ethnic cleavages, which finally created the weak common government. In this weak 
government, the most powers were provided to the Entities, which were not specifically 
granted to the central government. 
The perception of the DPA among the different ethnic groups reflects further 
division in thinking of the population. The Bosniaks supported a strong, unified state, 
whereas the Croats and Serbs sustained the idea of decentralization. Critics of the DPA 
argued that “Bosnia and Herzegovina would fall apart, as soon as the quite vast 
international military presence deployed to the territory was withdrawn… the settlement 
seemed morally wrong and politically impracticable, but still necessary in order to end 
violence of a scale and intensity not seen in Europe since the end of the Second World 
War.”126 The power, provided for the entities contributed to the further destabilization of 
the country, thus it kept the secessionist dream alive. Through several years, this posed 
indisputable challenges to building a viable and self-sustaining state. 
In Bosnia, the Dayton peace Accords of 1995 established a tri-national state that 
grants Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs equal protection and ensures political representation 
and power according to each groups’ numerical strength. Thus, the main central bodies of 
Bosnia require the participation of all three nationalities. However, the power-sharing in 
Bosnia is perceived as being ‘imported’ rather than a result of the will of the polity, or at 
least of the political representatives of national groups, because the Dayton Agreement 
represented none of the parties’ preferred outcome. 
The three-person Presidency of Bosnia is based on national and territorial 
exigencies. Thus, the Presidency consists of a Serb directly elected by the citizens of the 
RS and a Bosnian Muslim and a Bosnian Croat both directly elected by citizens of the  
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Federation. Decisions by the Presidency are supposedly by majority, but the disapproval 
of a policy by the representative of any one of the ethnic groups on the grounds of vital 
interest can effectively block a decision. 
The principal instrument of group inclusion is comprised of two-chamber 
parliaments, where the upper chambers at state and entity levels have numerically fixed 
numbers of seats reserved for all groups: parity at the state-level and based on the 1991 
population census in the entities. The lower houses of parliament have minimum seat 
requirements in the entities and an entity-specific seat division at the state level. All cases 
have some type of veto mechanism that ensures that non-dominant groups cannot be 
outvoted. 
On the national level, the upper House of Peoples thus has fifteen delegates: five 
Serbs appointed by the RS legislature and five Croats and five Muslims appointed by the 
Federation legislature. At least three delegates of each national group must be present for 
a quorum. The forty-two member lower House of Representatives is comprised of 
fourteen members of each ethnic group, with a majority of elected members constituting 
a quorum. Only when a representative of one of the ethnic groups declares a measure to 
be contravening vital interest must it be subjected to a special vote by the House of 
Peoples, with a majority of the delegates of all three national groups present and 
voting.127 
Much of the governmental business is undertaken at the Entity level. Each of the 
Entities was granted its own president, legislature, and military. The central government, 
which controls no army, police, or judiciary, and is dependent upon the Entities for its 
funding, has very little influence over these subsidiary governments. And, of course, the 
Entities, likewise, have little incentive to support the work that the central government 
does. Thus, ethnicity has become a guiding norm for politics in Bosnia. 
Since the West considered elections to be the key test for democracy, the 
international community was determined to hold elections as soon as possible after the 
shooting stopped in order to give Bosnia at least the veneer of pluralism. However, the 
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first Bosnian state, Entity and cantonal elections were problematic, as each side sought 
advantage by exploiting loopholes in the electoral rules. For example, Bosnians were 
permitted to vote in areas outside of their pre-war residences or “in the municipality in 
which they intend to live in future,” which permitted electoral engineering and ethnic 
gerrymandering for control of desired areas. 
As flawed as they were, the elections produced the predictable results: each of the 
nationalist parties won an absolute majority among its own constituents. Thus, the three 
nationalist parties, the Croat HDZ, the Bosnian Muslim SDA, and the Serb SDS 
dominated at the polls, producing, unsurprisingly, ethnically biased results.128 
Concerning the very first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina UN, NATO and 
Western officials were optimistic that, if given a choice among candidates in free 
elections, locals would view the choice as it was viewed in the West, would want to 
distance themselves from nationalist projects, would reject the rhetoric of hatred, and 
would vote for anti-nationalist candidates. Expectations were too high. Christopher Bird, 
a spokesperson for the Office of the High Representative said in 2000 that “after the huge 
political changes which brought democracy to Croatia and Yugoslavia, this was a chance 
for Bosnian voters to catch the tide in the Balkans, and we thought they would take it. To 
some extent they did, but the pace of change is frustratingly slow.”129 
Immediately after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, continuous debates 
began regarding whether it is a success or failure. Certainly, it has many flaws and it is 
far from perfect. Whether Dayton was the best agreement that could have been made to 
end an ugly war is difficult to say. Dayton’s mediators had cobbled together a flawed 
peace to stop a war wherein humanitarian and political consequences had finally become 
unbearable to international observers. They accomplished what none had yet been able 
to—a lasting cease fire—amid daunting challenges. The critical question was whether 
implementation could compensate for such an unpromising beginning. Dayton was more 
about ending war than building peace. 
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C. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE DPA 
Since none of the Western states wanted to see a breakup of Yugoslavia and to set 
up new countries “based solely on the criteria of blood and the winner takes all,”130 
initially, European decision makers preferred to portray the war as a humanitarian 
disaster, requiring humanitarian aid, diplomatic efforts, and credible peacekeeping. 
When, however, it became obvious that traditional peacekeeping could not stop the war, 
American leadership and American troops on the ground were requested as the only 
viable means to bring the fighting to an end.131 NATO’s decision to intervene militarily 
in BiH and then to deploy IFOR in 1995 were extremely controversial at that time. The 
first public criticism centered on NATO’s late intervention. While people were massacred 
because of their ethnicity, the international community stood on the sidelines, and NATO 
was blamed for its inactivity. According to several observers, NATO could have 
prevented the horrible war with a decisive intervention shortly after the fighting broke 
out.132 
Concerning the UN, NATO-UN strains rose primarily from uncertainty about 
which organization had ultimate authority to order – and discontinue – air strikes and to 
assess the situation on the ground. This brought the dual key solution. 
The turning point in the Bosnian War came when NATO took the lead, launching 
a two-week air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces in the summer of 1995. Before, 
Croatian forces had re-conquered Western Slavonia and Krajina and had moved far into 
Bosnia, thus changing the power balance on the ground. This paved the way for the 
Dayton Agreement, the peace accord ending the Bosnian War that came into force on 20 
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December 1995, under which a 60,000-strong NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) 
took military responsibility for the peace process.133  
 
Figure 4.   Bosnia and Herzegovina: IFOR/SFOR areas of responsibility in 1996134 
 
The deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force was charged with providing a 
secure environment for the implementation of the peace agreement.135 Subsequently, in 
the last twelve years an estimated half a million international military have served in 
                                                 
133 NATO Briefing, Crisis Management, Building peace and stability in crisis regions, (October, 
2003) p. 2., Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/crisis_management2/crisis-management2-e.pdf 
(accessed on: 5/27/2006).
134 ReliefWeb, Available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SKAR-
64GE7U?OpenDocument&rc=4&cc=bih (accessed: June 2, 2007). 
135 David Chandler, “From Dayton to Europe,” 338. 
 56
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Their responsibility has been to implement the military 
provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords, first as IFOR, then as SFOR and most recently 
as EUFOR. This peace support operation is now the longest running and most mature of 
the post Cold War style of international peace support operations. It can now be seen that 
the force has been broadly successful, thanks to its broad mandate and its consistent 
approach. 
The helpful specificity in the military annexes enabled military implementation to 
proceed apace. The implementation tasks specified in the DPA were completed within 
twelve months and the focus of the force moved to stabilization. This was remarkable, 
given that while it was reassuringly large, the IFOR was not a homogeneous force; 
variable standards of training, doctrine and military traditions all had to be taken into 
account. Moreover, some non-NATO forces were included within IFOR, most notably a 
sizable Russian contingent. Nonetheless, the IFOR commander had enough forces so that, 
generally, forces could be assigned tasks that were within their capability. The civilian 
implementers rarely had sufficient resources to allow this luxury. 
1. IFOR 
IFOR was deployed in December 1995 following UNSC Resolution 1031. It had 
a one-year mandate to oversee implementation of the military aspects of the peace 
agreement: bringing about and maintaining an end to hostilities; separating the armed 
forces of BiH’s two entities; transferring territory between the two entities according to 
the peace agreement; and moving the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into approved 
storage sites. 
NATO started Operation Joint Endeavor on 20 December 1995, as the Alliance’s 
first large-scale operational peacekeeping mission. Within a few weeks nearly 60,000 
IFOR soldiers from more than 30 countries – many of them non-NATO members – were 
deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The territory was divided in three sectors with one 
Multinational Division deployed in each sector. Each of the three lead nations was given 
command over a sector (FR, UK, US). 
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In the military sphere, IFOR accomplished much in a short period. The primary 
mission of IFOR’s Operation Joint Endeavor was to ensure compliance among the parties 
to the Dayton peace agreement, especially as concerns the cessation of hostilities, the 
establishment of zones of separation between opposing forces,136 and the establishment 
of “cantonments” of heavy arms. This was accomplished. IFOR also contributed greatly 
to freedom of movement (FOM) by monitoring and clearing minefields as well as by 
building or repairing roads and bridges. 
Further to its original mission, IFOR contributed to the mission of other 
international actors in the theatre. IFOR had begun to increase its patrols in support of 
Freedom of Movement (FOM), because FOM is critical to free and fair elections. IFOR 
also dismantled checkpoints and worked out procedures for refugee return with the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) to promote peaceful movements of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). Additionally, the improvements IFOR made to civilian infrastructure, 
such as roads, bridges, and railways, enhanced both IFOR’s primary mission and civilian 
FOM. In support of the September 1996 elections, IFOR increased its presence near 
polling stations to minimize the chances of disruption or intimidation, provided the 
OSCE with personnel and logistic support, and assisted in printing and distributing voter 
lists and information materials. To the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), IFOR provided area security, threat assessments, communications 
support, accommodation, storage of ICTY owned heavy digging equipment, and 
emergency assistance for Tribunal teams investigating war crimes in and around 
Srebrenica, Brcko, and other areas of Bosnia.137 
Critics argue that while IFOR stopped the open conflict, one important 
contribution the international community that could have been made was to ensure the 
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arrest and surrender to the ICTY of individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Criminals indicted by the ICTY remained at liberty and continued to 
influence events behind the scenes. However, IFOR and NATO commanders made 
repeated statements that their troops will not search for suspects indicted by the ICTY, 
and will arrest suspects only if they encounter them in the course of their regular duties. 
IFOR has not complied with even this limited interpretation of its mandate. Undoubtedly, 
the Republika Srpska was in most flagrant violation of the Tribunal’s order. It allowed 
Radovan Karadzic—founding member and president of the Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDS) from 1992 until 1996 and the first president of the Bosnian Serb administration—
and Ratko Mladic—commander of the Bosnian Serb army from 1992 until 1995—to 
exercise continued political and military control. The major weakness of the 
implementation of the DPA had been the international community’s lack of political will 
to use the implementation and enforcement mechanisms available. Another problem was 
the security vacuum that was created before IFOR arrived in full strength (chance for 
spoilers) and the need for IFOR to take on tasks since the civilians arrived so late. 
IFOR’s robust mandate paved the way for the end of open hostilities and fights 
among the Serbs, Croatians and Bosnians. The three armies were successfully separated 
and their partial demobilization went off as scheduled. However, the internal social and 
political environment of BiH remained highly fragile and insecure. By the end of 1996, 
IFOR had successfully implemented the peace. It was now up to NATO to stabilize this 
peace, a task reflected in the name of the new force: Stabilization Force (SFOR).  
2. SFOR 
In Dayton, the assumption was that IFOR would be able to leave after one year. 
That proved to be an illusion. An agonizing debate followed in NATO. It was finally 
decided that a force smaller than IFOR but more robust than traditional UN peacekeeping 
forces was needed to provide a shift from “implementation to stabilization.” Recognizing 
that maintaining a reduced military presence would be necessary to stabilize the peace 
after IFOR’s mandate, NATO set up the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Under UNSC Res. 
1088 of 12 December 1996, SFOR was authorized to implement the military aspects of 
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the Peace Agreement as the legal successor to IFOR. It had a one and a half year 
mandate. Like IFOR, SFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace 
enforcement). 
The SFOR emphasis was more on civil-military relations and deterrence; 
however, the reduction in the force’s size meant that fewer engineers and other specialists 
were available to assist in rebuilding Bosnia’s infrastructure. SFOR was tasked to deter 
hostilities and contribute to a secure environment by providing continued presence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, support key areas including primary civil implementation 
organizations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace without further need 
for NATO-led military forces inside the country. However, owing to the significantly 
improved security situation in the country, the size of the troops was shrunk dramatically 
(nearly to half of IFOR’s 60,000 force strength).138 
NATO extended SFOR in June 1998; however, this time without a specified end-
date. The country was still too instable to formulate an effective exit-strategy. According 
to the UN Resolution SFOR was supposed to stay until Bosnia’s governing institutions, 
including its security institutions, were fully viable and self-sustaining. Primary mission 
of SFOR was to contribute to a safe and secure environment, specifically to (1) deter or 
prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace; (2) promote a climate in 
which the peace process can continue to move forward; and (3) provide selective support 
to civilian organizations within its capabilities. 
More focus had to be given to the civilian aspects as well. While the civilian 
aspects were carried out by appropriate international organizations under the coordination 
of the High Representative, SFOR continued to provide support for: (1) OSCE – secure 
environment for different elections and for the preparations for those elections; (2) 
UNHCR – supervising tasks for the return of refugees and displaced persons; (3) IPTF – 
in its role of promoting local law and order; (4) ICTY – in carrying out its mandate. 
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By January 2003, SFOR was further reduced to 12,000 troops. Due to the 
increased role played by the Bosnian authorities in providing a secure and safe 
environment for their citizens, by June 2004 SFOR adopted a new operational profile, the 
so-called “Deterrent Presence.” This approach was reflected in a reduction of troops 
down to approximately 7,000. The Multinational Brigades established in 2003 were 
renamed Multinational Task Forces (MNTFs). Each MNTF consisted of approximately 
1,800 persons. The new NATO profile was based on the quick availability of tactical, 
operational and strategic reserves and a comprehensive “Situational Awareness” about 
the situation and development in the country.139 
According to the critical assessment of various NGOs, such as the International 
Crisis Group, SFOR left Bosnia without having fulfilled all of its tasks. The three most 
urgent were: 1) arresting war criminals; 2) monitoring and securing the numerous 
weapons storage sites and preventing weapons from reaching the black-market; and 3) 
reforming Bosnia’s armed forces. Many Bosnians express irritation that the world’s 
strongest military alliance was contemplating withdrawal without having arrested 
Karadzic and Mladic. This was a substantial failure, as both continue to exercise undue 
influence over Bosnia’s political life and inhibit the formation of stable state institutions. 
On the other hand, the contributions of both IFOR and SFOR have been both 
immense and indispensable. It is thanks to IFOR’s deployment and successful execution 
of its mission that the civil war in Bosnia came to an end at all. That mission was defined 
in the military sections of the Dayton Accords but had a significant role in supporting the 
civilian aspects of the DPA as well.140 The increasing security of BiH is reflected the 
most in the continuing reduction of international military forces. During the nine-year-
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60,000 to 7,000 by 2004. This positive development and the increased role played by 
Bosnian authorities paved the way for the transition from NATO to the European 
Union.141 
The successful termination of SFOR does not mean the end of NATO’s 
engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A relatively small-sized Headquarter, NATO 
HQ Sarajevo, was established in December, 2004. The principal task of NATO HQ 
Sarajevo has been to provide advice on defense reform and assistance to the Bosnian 
authorities in reforming the armed forces and eventually moving towards a single military 
force. NATO HQ will also undertake certain operational tasks, including counter-
terrorism whilst ensuring force protection and support to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with regard to the detention of persons142 
indicted for war crimes and intelligence sharing with the EU. 
3. EUFOR 
In December 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the center of international 
news agencies attention once again. This time, the change of international military 
presence was the major reason for this delicate attention. The NATO-led SFOR troops 
were replaced by the EUFOR mission of the EU, thus becoming the major guarantor of 
security in BiH. According to Lord Paddy Ashdown: “It’s the biggest, most important 
realization of the Common European Foreign and Security policy. It has to succeed 
because, upon this, the whole of the rest of the policy will be based.”143 
At the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, the EU expressed its 
willingness to take over responsibility for the military operation in Bosnia. This 
willingness demonstrated the EU’s recently developed military capabilities and signaled 
the EU’s commitment to BiH itself. What was even more significant was the EU’s 
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provision of an integrated approach that connected the various players and elements: the 
EU Special Representative (EUSR), Paddy Ashdown, who was also the High 
Representative (HR) in BiH; the EU Police Mission (EUPM), the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP) designed to draw the whole region, including Bosnia, into the 
EU, and now a possible EU-led military operation.144 
EUFOR was authorized three times by the UN SC, first in 2004, then in 2005, and 
in 2006. The reason was a significant delay in the transfer of responsibility, due first to 
US hesitation, and then to a Turkish veto. This severely strained NATO-EU relations. UN 
SC also authorized the continued presence of a NATO HQ as a legal successor to the 
SFOR. The EU made it very clear that any such military operation would be conducted in 
close cooperation with NATO and would be based on the Berlin Plus arrangement,145 
which was eventually concluded in March 2003.146 
The main security challenges the EU had to face have been weapons smuggling, 
the apprehension of war criminals, extremist religious groups, and border security, rather 
than the separation of combatants which was the main achievement of the NATO 
mission. 
The EU set up short-, medium- and long-term political objectives. The short term 
objectives have been to ensure a seamless transition from NATO-led SFOR to EUFOR 
and to strengthen local capacity building. The medium-term political objectives have 
been “to support Bosnia’s progress towards EU integration by its own efforts, by 
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contributing to a safe and secure environment with the objective of signing a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with Bosnia paving the way for accession negotiations.”147 
The EU’s long-term political objective for Bosnia has been a “stable, viable, peaceful and 
multiethnic Bosnia, cooperating peacefully with its neighbors and irreversibly on track 
towards EU membership.”148 
To support the EU’s short- and medium-term political goals and those of Security 
Council resolution 1575, the EU formulated the following overarching military objectives 
for its operation Althea: fulfill the role specified in Annexes 1a and 2 of the Dayton 
Accords and contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH to support the 
achievement of the necessary political and economic reforms. 
Last year, EU foreign ministers tentatively agreed to reduce the EU peacekeeping 
force in Bosnia by more than half in 2007, thus reducing the force to 2,500. The proposed 
cuts are part of a plan for a gradual withdrawal of the peacekeeping force and its 
replacement with a civilian EU mission, which could be on the agenda by the end of 
2008. 
D. THE ROAD TO A MORE VIABLE BOSNIA 
1. Stateness 
a. Legitimacy of the State 
The ghost of secession of the Republika Srpska and the Croatian part of 
the FBiH and their merging with their “mother lands” did not fade with the DPA. Instead, 
the Accords kept this ghost alive. The artificial division of the country by the Inter Entity 
Boundary Line (IEBL) makes it even more visible. Thus, Serb and Croat nationalists, 
who have always sought to secede from the country, continued to contest Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a state. While in recent years the idea of violent secession seemed to 
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disappear and there were no major organized groups149 who sought openly the break-up 
of the country by force, just a year ago, right after the Montenegrin memorandum, leaders 
of RS still talked about the possibility of secession from BiH.150 This is further 
aggravated by the uncertain situation in the whole region regarding for example the 
Kosovo status as well, because these two issues set the stage for inflammatory talk of 
self-determination in the RS. Furthermore, there is evidence that officials in Belgrade 
attempted to connect the fates of Kosovo and the Republika Srpska. 
The political leadership in the Entities largely derives its legitimacy from 
existing divisions in Bosnia and the absence of a cross-community consensus on reform. 
The HR had to use his Bonn Powers extensively to remove spoilers from office, though 
the effect was often ambivalent. For example, the “RS government forced its SDA 
members to resign after the OHR dismissed 60 officials of the RS for not cooperating 
with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in July 
2004.”151 State legitimacy improved slightly as higher accountability standards were 
implemented and a number of corrupt officials were removed from office and prosecuted 
for aiding war crimes fugitives.152 
According to the 2005 report of the United Nations Development 
Program, in Bosnia and Herzegovina “the weak and ineffective central state is not 
capable of fulfilling its necessary functions. It cannot establish universal standards, nor 
access to basic services, and a minimum level of social protection. The weak state also 
fails to establish unified regulatory and common practices that might bring together the 
disparate economic, administrative and political spaces. The real and perceived 
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ineffectiveness of institutions provide a fertile ground for the survival of outmoded 
ideologies and manipulative politics. The weaknesses at the state level are also a huge 
obstacle to decentralization. In a decentralized administrative structure, the central state 
has a function that cannot be neglected. It must regulate and harmonize, creating 
incentives that coordinate and rationalize the activities of the parts of the whole.”153 
b. Refugee Return 
The number of returning refugees and displaced persons to their homes 
has been declining from year to year. According to sources provided by UNHCR and the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights around half of the more than two 
million people displaced during the war have recorded their return to their previous 
homes. According to the UNHCR, of the total returns “nearly three-quarters went back to 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one-quarter to Republika Srpska. Some 
20,000 have returned to Brcko District, which is administered separately from the two 
Entities enshrined in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.”154  
Violence against returning refugees has declined in recent years. 
Nevertheless, refugees who return to areas where their respective community does not 
dominate often face administrative hurdles and other forms of discrimination, in addition 
to sporadic attacks. Formal rights of non-dominant communities have been secured in a 
series of amendments to the entity constitutions in 2002 and subsequent legislation. 
However, these rights are rarely implemented. This is reflected in a relatively low 
number of returnees to the areas in which their ethnic group does not represent the 
majority of population (only 20 percent of the total number of returns).155 While 
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according to certain sources, ten years after Dayton around one million of the refugees 
have returned to their homes, a 2006 analysis of the International Helsinki Federation 
(IHF) for Human Rights revealed that “about one million Bosnians and Herzegovinians 
still remained abroad, most of them having become permanent residents or citizens of the 
country they stayed in.” The analysis suggests that only one-third of the total number of 
refugees and displaced persons had returned to their homes. Moreover, the reality is that 
in most cases only one or two elderly members of a family returned to the repossessed 
apartment or house then sold or exchanged the property (there are towns and villages 
where 90 per cent of the houses were sold in the last few years). There are several people 














Figure 5.   Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of concern to 
UNHCR157 
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The Law for Protection of the Rights of National Minorities was adopted 
in 2003; however, its implementation still has not commenced. According to the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in BiH, the economic and social rights of the members of 
minority groups are more frequently violated then those of constituent peoples. 
Procedural obstacles made it impossible for national minorities to elect their 
representatives for local assemblies in the 2004 local elections; subsequently the minority 
groups remain deprived of opportunities to influence political developments. 
The civil rights of returning refugees continue to be violated by local and 
entity authorities in the form of open or tacit discrimination. Restricted economic 
opportunities after returning back to the previous home, aggravated by ethnic 
discrimination in employment, are a primary obstacle to return. An example of how the 
ethnic composition of a workforce changed is Aluminij Mostar, widely regarded as one 
of the country’s most profitable and prominent companies: 
 
 1992 2003 
Bosniaks 33% 3% 
Bosnian Croats 44% 93% 
Bosnian Serbs 23% 4% 
Table 1.   Ethnic composition of Aluminij’s workforce before and after the war158 
 
Nevertheless, great progress has been made since 1996, in particular with 
regard to the restitution of property. The authorities, in areas where there are minority 
returnees, often show favoritism toward the majority returnees when it comes to property 
rights and allocating financial resources. 
The situation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
worsened, however, as thousands of people remained displaced within BiH—according 
to the UNHCR around 313,000—and refugees encountered significant obstacles in 
returning home. Minority returnees often faced intimidation and discrimination, lack of 
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access to health care and pension benefits, and denial of utility services by publicly 
owned companies. This discrimination contributed to group grievance as the country is 
still deeply ethnically divided, and tensions between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs 
continue to fester.159 According to Amnesty International “discrimination in employment 
continues to be one of the most serious obstacles to the return of refugees and internally 
displaced people to their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”160 
c. The Effects of Religion on the State 
The state is defined as secular, and religious dogmas have no noteworthy 
influence over law or policy making. State and Entity level constitutions provide the 
framework for freedom of religion and individuals generally enjoy this right in ethnically 
integrated areas or in areas where they are adherents of the majority religion; however, 
adherents of religions in largely ethnically homogenous areas where they are in a small 
minority have had their right to worship restricted, sometimes violently. The overlap of 
religious and ethnic identity has resulted in the use of religious symbols for nationalist 
purposes in Bosnia. 
The Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Serb Orthodox religious communities 
reported a significant number of attacks on religious objects. A number of illegally 
constructed religious objects continued to cause ethnic/religious tension and conflict in a 
number of communities.161 
The dominance of religious institutions has decreased in the last few years, 
for example, the emphasis of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the RS, including in the  
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constitution, has promoted the exclusion of Croats and Bosniaks in the past. 
Constitutional amendments and changes to legislation eliminated this form of 
discrimination in 2002. 
Informally, however, religious institutions continue to significantly 
influence Bosnian politics. Religious leaders’ extensive involvement in politics was 
exposed during the pre-election campaign for general elections in 2002 and municipal 
elections in 2004. In both cases, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH 
reported on the significant influence of religious leaders on election outcomes, exercised 
by directing the electorate toward the three nationalist parties: the SDS, SDA and HDZ. 
Furthermore, during the election campaign in 2006, a number of religious officials and 
clerics used the occasion to instruct their adherents on how to vote. Even children were 
used as tools for political manipulation.162 
The interference of religion in politics produces a two-fold effect: (1) the 
ethnic religious elites have grown into influential interest groups in BiH’s political 
discourse, often impacting policy outcomes, and (2) the fragmentation of the political 
agenda along ethnic nationalist lines, and subsequently the process of ethnic 
homogenization is being perpetuated. 
Religious intolerance in the country directly reflected ethnic intolerance 
because of the virtually indistinguishable identification of ethnicity with one’s religious 
background. Bosniaks generally were associated with Islam, Bosnian Croats with the 
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2. Political Participation 
a. Free and Fair Elections 
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia has had either 
general or local elections almost every year. The war left lasting scars. Though Bosnians 
are no longer frightened of the other ethnic groups, they remain suspicious and strongly 
influenced by nationalist rhetoric. This is seen most clearly in the numerous elections that 
have taken place since Dayton, in which they have almost invariably voted for parties of 
their own ethnic group.164 Over the last twelve years, there have been five general 
elections (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2006). The first three general elections were 
organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina under provisional election 
rules drawn up by the organization in line with its Dayton mandate. 
The rational behind the architects of the idea of early elections in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1996 was to permit the articulation of a broad spectrum of political 
identities, ideologies and interests that would triumph over the ethnic polarization that 
had fueled the war. The international authorities hoped that “the practice of competitive 
politics would help the country to put its bitter civil war, and the cleavages that motivated 
it, in the past. This would require either changes in voter preferences that significantly 
reduced the vote shares of the wartime nationalist parties, or changes in preferences, 
strategies and behaviors of those parties.”165  
Initially, elections in Bosnia were seen simply as part of the usual quick 
exit strategy. On the one hand, Carl Bildt, the first High Representative, argued, that 
elections constituted the end of the peace implementation process, and thus paved the 
way for the exit of IFOR from the country. However, critics feared that early elections 
might simply legitimize the wartime gains of the nationalist parties. 
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On the other hand, Bildt argued in one of his speeches that “elections in 
Bosnia will be more than usually important. It is of course vital that people have the 
opportunity to choose their own representatives, to create a new legitimacy. But even 
more pressing is the task of creating the joint institutions which are the only way of 
bringing the country together again after years of war. The longer we wait for the 
elections, the longer the forces of ethnic separation and partition will prevail.”166  
At the first post-war elections, the nationalist wartime parties, the 
(Bosniak) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and 
the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) won convincingly, acquiring 66 percent of the 
mandate.167 These elections were marked by a high turnout, with a clear division among 
representatives of the nationalists and the representatives of alternative unifying 
ideologies, primarily that of the Social Democratic Party. In subsequent elections, 
domination by the nationalist parties was solidified.168 
In 2002, the Bosnian electoral commission, rather than the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), organized general elections for the first 
time, autonomously, without major problems. The first domestically organized elections 
in Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) since the war produced some surprise, firstly because the 
three nationalist parties regained control of the principal state and entity parliaments and 
executive posts in the 5 October 2002 poll; and secondly because they were also accepted 
by the new High Representative (OHR), Paddy Ashdown, as people with whom he could 
do business.169 
The report of the Crisis Group in 2003 revealed that both during the 
campaign and the elections itself nationalist issues were more implicit than explicit in the 
2002 campaign. Public opinion polls before the elections and politicians’ assessments 
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thereafter were in agreement that voters were more interested in economic and social 
issues – job-creation, improvements in health care, pension payments – than in 
emblematic national questions. The majority of respondents told the pollsters they wanted 
the parties to offer solutions to their pressing economic problems and practical ideas 
about how to improve their lives. Yet, in the end, the results showed that those people 
who took the trouble to vote were still inclined to cast their ballots on behalf of the 
parties they identified with their entity and nation. One feature of these elections 
emphasized by RS politicians was that people tended to vote within their entity’s 
political-ideological spectrum.170 
The October 1st general elections in BiH in 2006 were the first elections 
since the Dayton Agreement to be fully administered by the BiH authorities and 
represented further improvement and progress in the consolidation of democracy and rule 
of law. The manner in which these elections were conducted was generally in line with 
international standards for democratic elections. While officially the election campaign 
was one month long, the whole year in 2006 was marked as the campaign. The IHF in its 
report highlights that political leaders and election candidates largely resorted to 
nationalistic rhetoric and other activities that created fear among ethnic groups. Pre-
election statements were reminiscent of the pre-war era of the 1990s and the election 
results awarded those candidates who had radical political agendas rather than those open 
for dialogue and compromise.171 The campaign illuminated again the ominous nature of 
the spoiler problem because despite the fact that the three major nationalist parties lost 
some ground, the dangerous and radical nationalist rhetoric of the elected Muslim and 
Serb representatives poisoned the atmosphere by suggesting either the dissolution of the 
two Entities or self-determination of Republika Srpska. Instead of promoting their own 
programs, the candidates resorted to hate speech, inflammatory statements and offences. 
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The political landscape in BiH remains largely divided along ethnic lines, 
with other issues playing a less prominent role. Key contests occurred mainly among 
political parties that competed with one another in their own ethnic communities. Thus, 
the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS), the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), and other Serb parties competed for the 
Serb vote, while the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Party for BiH (SBiH) 
competed for Bosniak votes. On the Croat side, a degree of fragmentation resulted 
recently from the breakaway of the new Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990) 
from the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH). Some parties, including the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), tried to present a more multi-ethnic profile.172 
According to the National Human Development Report on Bosnia in 2007 
“Croats living in RS do not have an active right to vote for the Croat member of the BiH 
Presidency. Following the same logic, they cannot themselves be elected to the post. 
Instead, the Croat member of the BiH Presidency can only be elected from within the 
territory of FBiH. Thus the highest body of legislative power in BiH operates on the 
principle of ethnicity and territory and not on the basis of citizenship regardless of 
ethnicity or place of residence. The ethnic dimension is represented in the House of 
Peoples (where delegates are elected on the grounds of ethnicity), while the territorial 
dimension is embodied in the House of Representatives (the Entity majority has more 
weight here than the representational majority).”173 
All of these findings prove that more than a decade after the end of the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, still, little cross-ethnic voting takes place and most 
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b. Power to Govern 
The presidency of BiH currently rotates between a Serb, a Bosnian 
Muslim and a Croat. The State is supervised by the United Nations (UN) High 
Representative, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who took office in January 2006. The 
leadership is generally considered corrupt and non-representative, despite the tripartite 
presidency.174 Due to the considerable powers of the entities, Bosnia has, in fact, three 
governments, one for each entity and the state government. 
Considering that the system of government in Bosnia, at the state and 
entity level, is built on the principle of all communities being able to veto any decision, 
vetoing reform is deeply ingrained in the Bosnia’s postwar politics. The key veto players 
are the RS parties, which have been suspicious of most reform efforts for undermining 
the entity’s autonomy. International pressure, in particular by the OHR, has reduced their 
ability to veto the reform process. One could see the aforementioned December 2004 
failed attempt to block the state-level government through the resignation of all Serb 
members of government (following the OHR dismissal of police officers) as evidence of 
the ineffectiveness of veto players. 
The government has the power to govern in principle, but its ability to 
govern is constrained by the continued intervention of the OHR, the fragmentation of 
public authority in the entities and cantons, as well as the extensive veto rights at state 
and entity level. The OHR can veto legislation and decree laws, decisions and otherwise 
interfere in governance. 
The OHR made less use of these powers in 2004 than in previous years, 
but did dismiss more than 60 officials, including ministers and the president of parliament 
of the RS in 2004 over the lack of cooperation with the ICTY. The message of the HR 
sent to RS was very clear by saying that there is “no future, no stable peace, no road to  
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Europe, no path to NATO, no fulfillment of Dayton, no chance to put the past behind 
us,”175 until those indicted by the Hague Tribunal for the worst crimes against humanity 
have been arrested by the RS authorities.176 
The parties in power at the state level are in power at the entity level, 
resulting in considerable overlap in terms of political orientation. While all three 
governments formally seek to integrate Bosnia into the European Union and reform the 
system of government, they remain deeply entrenched in ethnically based politics and 
frequently postpone reforms for short-term benefits. 
International pressure and heavy-handed intervention has been largely 
responsible for most reform initiatives and legislation. As nationalist parties in 
government hold deep differences over the desirable nature of the state, the degree of 
central and entity competencies and the war, consensus-building in government has often 
been impossible, resulting in significant delays. Due to the ethnic electorates of the 
parties, they do not compete with each other but with the opposition parties, and all three 
nationalist parties possess strong authoritarian and paternalistic instincts toward their 
respective constituency. 
The state and entity governments formally seek to achieve reforms, but 
often rely on international intervention for their imposition and then frequently fail to 
implement them. The narrow ethnic agenda of the governing parties furthermore distorts 
the focus on reforms. In particular, in the RS, the parties’ goal to maintain a maximum 
degree of autonomy of the entity stands in conflict with the self-professed goal of reform. 
Though government activity was underscored by trenchant nationalism 
and petty personality rows, it remained stable and, moreover, achieved a major goal in 
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securing a contractual relationship with the EU. But none of this would have been 
achieved without the direct and sustained pressure of the international community.177 
Ultimate authority under Dayton still rests with the international 
community and the High Representative continues to hold extensive powers. Although 
the Peace Implementation Council has announced its intention to close the Office of the 
High Representative by mid-2007,178 pursuant the report and request of the current High 
Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling, on 27 February 2007 the Peace 
Implementation Council Steering Board extended the mandate of the Office until the end 
of June 2008. It did so in response to the HR assessment that progress made by the 
domestic authorities during the past twelve months in respect of their obligations under 
Dayton and the requirements of the European integration process fell short of what had 
been necessary to justify closure of the OHR this year.179 In this decision, the PIC 
Steering Board made it clear for the Bosnian political leadership that it will not tolerate 
any attempt to undermine Dayton. Although it is expected that the EU’s Special 
Representative will take on a greater role when the OHR shuts down, the candidates 
elected in the 2006 elections will nevertheless face a political context in which the 
international community is preparing to depart, demanding a new degree of responsibility 
from elected officials. All of the above illuminates that “too often it is the High 
Representative who ultimately takes decisions that later have to be implemented by the 
Bosnian parliament; thus, parliament regularly approves measures decided by others.”180 
Christian Schwarz Schilling, the current High Representative, openly departed from his 
predecessors, arguing that governing by decrees and firing officials does not work. In a 
recent report he wrote, “rather than providing hands-on leadership, OHR would offer 
advice and support to the domestic authorities as they assumed ownership of and full 
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responsibility for the country’s continuing progress towards both institutional 
sustainability and Euro-Atlantic integration.”181 
c. Freedom of Voice and Media 
The freedoms of opinion and the press are not restricted. Print and 
electronic media remain territorially and ethnically divided. As the Council of Europe 
noted in a monitoring report in 2005, “Bosnia still lacks a public broadcasting law in line 
with European standards. While a reformed state broadcaster began operating in August 
2004, necessary legal reforms were rejected by parliament in October 2004. Electronic 
media are regulated by the independent Regulatory Agency for Communication. 
However, the Council of Europe and other independent observers have voiced their 
concerns over the independence of the agency and possible attempts by the government 
to increase its influence over these institutions.”182 
Pressures and attacks on the mass media by the representatives of the 
political and religious leaders point to informal government attempts to establish control 
over media reporting. 
3. Political and Social Integration 
a. Parties in Parliament 
During and after the war, the three nationalistic parties controlled the vast 
majority of political life in BiH and governed in the interests of the respective dominant 
majorities. In many municipalities distant from larger centers, local leaderships had not 
changed since the end of the war, and ethnic power-groups often gathered around private 
economic interests, establishing complete control over municipal affairs. In larger 
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centers, discrimination and the misuse of power was less marked. This was due to a 
higher International Community presence, a stronger civil society and media scrutiny.183 
Representation in parliament following the 2002 general elections was 
relatively fragmented with an effective number of eight parties. This fragmentation is, 
however, not an indication of instability, as the large number of parties in parliament is 
the result of a complex electoral system favoring small parties and the fragmentation of 
the party system along ethnic lines. The Bosnian party system has been relatively stable 
due to the large degree of support the dominant nationalist parties enjoy among the three 
communities. In the elections for the state presidency in 2002, the three nationalist parties 
gained between 35.5 percent and 61.5 percent of the votes from their respective 
electorate.184 The low turnout represented a protest at the slow pace of reform in BiH, 
directed above all at punishing the parties that have been in government for the last two 
years.185 
These tense relations are not limited to competing parties representing 
different communities. Within each community, interaction between the governing and 
the main opposition parties are often tense and confrontational. These divisions are partly 
based on the conflict-ridden political climate during the past decade that reinforced these 
divisions. 
The Bosnian political leadership does nothing to promote social capital 
and is indifferent with respect to the role of civic engagement and solidarity. While 
nationalist parties do support narrow, ethnic civic engagement, cross-ethnic engagement 
is not encouraged, and the political leadership has often been suspicious toward civil 
society organizations. The political leadership is not engaged in broad societal dialogue, 
and there is little tradition of public discussion of reform initiatives. 
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The political leadership frequently ignores civil society actors and 
formulates its policy autonomously. Much of civil society has been critical toward the 
nationalist parties, thus not making them natural partners in the policy process. In 
contrast, international policy and lawmakers such as the OHR have, in the past, often 
included NGOs in the deliberation process and acted in consultation with civil society. 
Bosnian society and its political elite are deeply divided along ethnic lines. 
These lines were territorialized during the war, resulting in a strong geographic 
concentration of ethnic groups. Due to the predominance of ethnic issues in politics, 
multiethnic parties have not been able to build a significant electorate across the ethnic 
divide. Ethnically motivated incidents are rare, though, usually connected to refugees 
returning to areas where they now constitute a functional minority. 
Despite all the controversies since 1995, “on 27 March 2002, on the basis 
of a proposition emerging from the constitutional commission and as a result of various 
debates, Bosnian politicians succeeded in negotiating and signing an agreement of 
historic proportions. This agreement grants the same status to all constituent peoples and 
citizens in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus ensuring that all peoples 
and citizens are represented at all levels of government and public administration in both 
entities; it creates mechanisms assuring the protection of the interest of each community, 
as well as their representation in the decision-making organs. This is a first step towards 
overcoming separatist tendencies and, ultimately, towards the abolition of the entities. 
These constitutional principles strengthen the process of return and the reintroduction of 
multi-ethnicity into government and public service. The importance of the agreement is 
heightened by the fact that it was not imposed by the High Representative, but is the 
result of negotiations among political leaders of the two entities.”186 
As seen from the results of the various elections, the division of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina into separate voting blocks has been remarkably stable. On the other 
hand, the nationalist parties are no longer inherently a threat to the peace process. Marius 
Soberg argues that without external financial flows, opponents of the Bosnian state can 
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no longer maintain wasteful parallel institutions. Dependent on international aid, they are 
forced to stay on good terms with the international community. Unable to buy votes by 
redistributing the spoils of war, they face regular elections in which they can and will be 
excluded from power. This forces them to become more responsive to public demands. In 
other words, they are on their way to becoming mere political parties within a 
constitutional order.187 
b. The Entity Dominance 
While before the conflict the territory of BiH was ethnically mixed, the 
Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into territorial units on the basis 
of ethnic lines which finally created functionally unnatural boundaries. The war has 
completely altered the ethnic demography of the country. Thus, the artificially fabricated 
system promotes ethnic domination by territory (e.g., all Serb parties are based in the 
RS). This division is one of the most critical factors and the strongest root cause and 
manifestation of social exclusion, alienation and discrimination within the Bosnian 
society. Each and every part of the system “is based on an ethnic matrix, functioning 
within virtually mono-ethnic territories. Firstly, division along ethnic lines forms the 
basis of the BiH constitution, so that the whole system – state-level institutions, Entities, 
cantons, municipalities, even Brcko district – is structured in such a way that the sole 
precondition for the functioning of these institutions, and for the protection of human 
rights, is based upon ethnic affiliation.”188 
Generally, there is very little aggregation and articulation of societal 
interests through the political party system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, a top-
down manipulation of societal interests by the political elite prevails. This is especially 
true for nationalist parties. As none of the ethnic groups could achieve hegemony at the 
state-level, they have established their dominance at the entity level. The RS, the Serb 
entity, and the FBiH, as the Entity of the Croats and Bosniaks and ten, again ethnically 
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based, cantons, have proved to be bastions of protection for so-called 'national interests' 
of their respective majority peoples. They remain for the most part, mutually antagonistic 
and socially and politically distant. 
Entity institutions still remain strongly marked by ethnic politics and are 
perceived as institutions of one of the respective peoples. Most territorial units are split 
along ethnic lines. Members of minority ethnicities are still reported to be subject to 
human rights violations and be denied access to the same economic and social 
opportunities enjoyed by members of the dominant group. Ethnic fault lines thus also 
limit the creation of efficient systems of service delivery and local management.189 
According to a survey, revealed by the International Commission on the 
Balkans in 2005, 74 per cent of the Bosnian population evaluates the situation in the 
country as bad, and only 1 per cent contends that it is very good. In the same survey 77 
per cent of Bosnians evaluate the government as bad and merely 2 per cent as very good. 
Even more alarming is that for 21 per cent of Bosnians the nation is not important.190 
Besides, the “blame game” survey revealed that everyone blames everyone else more 
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Table 2.   The “blame game” survey results191 
 
The division between the two Dayton-created Entities marks a profound 
boundary within BiH. Each is effectively sovereign in the field of social policy and both 
have considerable scope to influence economic performance through their regulatory and 
institutional frameworks.192 In BiH, a contradiction exists between the inner structure of 
its society—inhabitants live and work not as BiH citizens, but as Serbs, Croats, or 
Bosniaks—on the one hand, and the universal goal of transition, on the other. This 
contradiction directly relates to whether the Bosnian society is represented by a collective 
whole, or rather by its three constituent peoples around which social relations are shaped 
and formulated.193 
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4. Stability of Democratic Institutions 
a. Friction between Institutions 
Democratic institutions fundamentally perform their functions. However, 
Bosnian citizens still face the challenge of the reconstruction of the social fabric. As it is 
stated in the National Human Development Report, “better opportunities for people can 
only be created through the reform of formal and informal institutions and the 
establishment of a constructive public life that effectively reforms, and then checks, those 
reshaped institutions.”194 
There are severe frictions between the institutions, in particular between 
the entities and the state level. Furthermore, at the state level itself, the strong ethnic 
interests, enshrined through veto rights, negatively affect institutional stability. The 
resignation of Serb members of the state government in late 2004 paralyzed the state 
government and highlighted the potential for destabilization, especially considering the 
lack of consensus over the organization of the state among the representatives of the three 
largest communities. 
Compared to the defense reform process, the broad public administration 
reform has been slower in producing concrete results, as it lacks focus and commitment 
from local institutions. It has also been difficult to reach consensus among international 
community actors on which approach to take and which institutions to focus on. OHR’s 
focus has been mainly on strengthening state institutions, and some substantial progress 
has been made in improving the functioning of the Council of Ministers and in staffing 
new ministries. The European Commission has taken on a lead role in conducting 
functional and vertical reviews of government institutions. However, the reviews have 
taken longer than planned and have so far not given the desired results.195 
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b. Lack of Legitimacy 
As a largely imposed institutional arrangement, the postwar Bosnian state 
has suffered continuously from a lack of legitimacy. A significant part of the Serb 
population does not recognize the Bosnian state or rejects any strengthening of the state, 
preferring independence for the RS or joining Serbia. Parts of the Croat population in 
western Herzegovina likewise reject the state and support secession to join Croatia. Most 
Bosniaks reject the RS as having been created through war crimes and support a 
considerably strengthened central state. 
The absence of a consensus on the strength of the central institutions and 
the extent of decentralization have prevented any genuine reform of the postwar 
constitutional framework. The High Representative illuminated this problem this March 
by arguing that “for years political parties in this country have held sensible and 
necessary legislation hostage to “big issues.” Thwarted on a strategic objective that lacks 
consensus, they will block progress on a tactical objective that has general 
support…When it comes to police reform and parties fail to reach agreement…the 
prospect of signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement…will slip over the 
horizon.”196 
Some smaller radical parties and movements among all three communities 
reject democratic pluralism and its institutions, but a more serious challenge arises from 
nationalist parties that support democratic institutions in principle but reject (implicitly or 
explicitly) the equality of the communities in the territory that they dominate. 
The average citizen in BiH perceives local governments as weak and 
unable to solve their problems. To an extent this is true, but a supply side marked out by 
poor performance is only part of the problem. On the demand side, citizens simply do not 
understand the competencies or for that matter, the potential of municipalities. In turn 
civic leaders fail to communicate effectively with citizens, and this leads to them being  
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blamed for problems where the solution lies with other levels of government or in the 
private domain. In practice both legitimate and misjudged claims feed citizen 
dissatisfaction.197 
5. International Cooperation 
As Bosnia has been a de facto protectorate over the past decade, cooperation with 
international donors has been intensive and has taken many forms. 
Cooperation with the ICTY has been a key obstacle in relations between Bosnia 
(in particular the RS) and international organizations and bilateral partners. Membership 
in the NATO Partnership for Peace was delayed in 2004 as a result, and sanctions by the 
OHR and the United States against the RS were imposed in 2004, until membership was 
finally accepted in 2006. The structure of the state has furthermore made international 
cooperation difficult, since the international community often lacks reliable partners in 
Bosnia and confronts the ethnic divide in every cooperation issue. NATO membership is 
the legal and political goal of Bosnia and Herzegovina, required by Article 80 of the state 
Law on Defense and by decision of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The process of concluding a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the 
European Union has been delayed not least due to the complicated structure of the state. 
Along with the other western Balkan states, Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks eventual full 
membership in the European Union and NATO. Both institutions have committed 
themselves to the region’s full integration, once various conditions have been met. In 
recent years, however, Bosnia has found itself more isolated from international 
organizations than most of its neighboring states.198 Bosnia joined NATO’s PfP in 
December 2006, although NATO had made capturing Karadzic and Mladic a condition 
before. On the other hand, because of the extremely slow pace of the reforms, such as 
police reform, and the reform of the public broadcasting system and service, Bosnia is the 
only state in the region which has not signed a Stabilizations and Association Agreement 
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with the EU yet. Delaying the required reforms, Bosnia and Herzegovina “risk becoming 
the only country in the region lacking a formal contractual relationship with the European 
Union. As a result, BiH risks falling behind all its neighbors and even behind countries 
that its citizens would once have resented being compared to.”199 
While the international community (IC) presence is vital if the peace process is to 
have a successful outcome, there have been several grains of sand in the cog-wheel of the 
international community. 
While the military implementation of the DPA was well prepared with definite 
deadlines and goals, the IC did not set a long-term strategic vision for the civilian 
implementation. Moreover, in 1995 and 1996 the IC believed in a quick exit strategy, 
thus suffering from short-termism, which finally led to the absence of a well established 
overall strategy. According to officials working in Bosnia during the years right after the 
war, “the Principals’ Meetings of the major intergovernmental organizations in Sarajevo 
have had little strategic focus. Their agendas have been dictated largely by events. In the 
words of a senior international official who attends them: Meetings would lurch from 
crisis in “region A” to crisis in “region B”. When there were no crises, meetings were 
frequently cancelled.”200 
The presence of large numbers of organizations with different reporting lines (the 
principal actors are: OHR/EU, OSCE, UNMIBH, UNHCR), with unclear mandates and 
with functional overlap. For example “the Refugee Return and Reconstruction Task 
Force (RRTF) was co-chaired by the UNHCR and OHR. Local RRTF meetings 
comprised three or four municipalities. Meetings were generally conducted without 
incident, except for the underlying “turf battle” between OHR and UNHCR for outright 
control of the group. NGO representatives seemed genuinely perplexed about which 
would be the best choice for the lead role. The tension between OHR and UNHCR was 
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not unfounded. OHR was technically the lead organization in all development activities. 
However, UNHCR was “mandated” to take a lead role by the peace agreement itself 
(Annex 7).”201 
Other intractable issues that undermine international effectiveness relate to 
personality and to personal and institutional self-interest. International staff members 
usually have half an eye on their next posting with their home government or 
international bureaucracy.202 
The international financial institutions (IFIs)—the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD)—have not been invited to the regular meetings of the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC), where OHR speaks on economic issues. For example, “at the PIC meeting 
in May 2000, which concluded that economic development was the main priority, the 
heads of the World Bank and IMF missions in Bosnia, and the governor of the Central 
Bank, were invited to participate only in the first half of proceedings, and were asked to 
leave when talk turned to corruption. None of the IFIs was present at the PIC meeting in 
Brussels in September 2001 where economic development was again discussed. This 
exasperates the IFIs, as it seems to show that the IC has not accepted that economic 
regeneration is essential.”203 
Furthermore, a significant shift can be observed in the commitment of the 
European Union and the United States. While European incapability and strong US 
commitment was peculiar to the early periods of the Bosnian peace- and state-building 
endeavor, this seems to be upside down in the contemporary Bosnia.  
Prior to 2000, the EU only played a subordinate and supporting role within the 
PIC Dayton framework. The EU’s close involvement in BiH politics was formally 
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limited to the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement. From 2000 onwards this 
relationship reversed. The primary responsibility for implementation shifted informally 
from the PIC to the EU and, without any formal consultation of the people of BiH, 
Dayton gradually was to become subordinate to the requirements for eventual EU 
membership.204  
The EU thus not only took over from SFOR the military implementation, it also 
increasingly dominated the civilian implementation. Vice versa, because of its 
engagement in other conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the US lost interest in the 
peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, there is a significant shift from US 
leadership towards EU ownership in BiH. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The chapter introduced the Dayton Peace Accords, its background, the difficulties 
in and the most significant aspects of creating this unique treaty. Following the 
introduction of the DPA the chapter investigated the viability of the Bosnian state along 
the two major components of the DPA, the military aspects and, in more depth, the 
civilian implementation. The civilian aspects of the DPA were scrutinized through the 
lenses of the major indicators of state viability, determined in the previous chapter, such 
as legitimacy of the state, stateness, political parties and participation of the society, 
social integration, democratic institutions and the ability to engage in international 
matters. 
The findings of the chapter revealed that Bosnia-Herzegovina has made great 
advances in transformation since the end of the 1992-1995 war. The military 
implementation is undeniably a great success, which is proved most visibly by the 
steadily shrinking number of the troops in the country. 
Much of the infrastructure has been rebuilt, and half of all refugees and displaced 
persons have returned to their pre-war homes. Political and ethnic violence is rare and 
does not threaten to destabilize the country. Weak and ineffective in the years 
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immediately following the war, state government is now functional. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
has held regular democratic elections since 1996 and governments at the state level and 
of the two entities have changed. 
Over the past twelve years, stateness, political participation and the rule of law 
have improved in some segments. State institutions have become more effective and 
gained key competencies. Reform of the public administration, including armed forces 
and police, has made significant progress. Due to the changed regional context, support 
for secession in Bosnia declined and the formally exclusive control of nationalist parties 
began to erode. Furthermore, some internationally managed institutions and 
competencies, such as the organizations of elections, have reverted to Bosnian control. 
The divergent views on the nature of the state held by the political leadership and 
the fact that the most sought after indicted war criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko 
Mladic, remain at large has constrained the pace of reforms and eroded the credibility of 
the international community. 
Despite these successes, Bosnia’s transformation has been slow and continues to 
face several challenges. Most political reform initiatives have been driven by 
international rather than local political actors. Indeed, international actors pushed for the 
establishment of a joint command for the entity-based armed forces and a State 
Investigation and Protection Agency to investigate serious crimes. Lacking domestic 
political support, the implementation of several reforms is therefore sluggish. The 
importance of external actors in the transformation process is closely linked to the 
nationalist parties’ power as they dominate state and entity governments, particularly 
after having won the elections in 2002. Formally, these parties support reform. However, 
their narrow ethno-nationalist agenda conflicts with the clear goal of advancing 
transformation. Moderate parties of the opposition have been weak and similarly divided 
between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. 
The level of consolidation of democracy has not changed substantially. Non-
nationalist parties remain weak and divided whereas the nationalist parties mostly pay lip 
service to reform but delay implementation. The divisions along ethnic lines remain 
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pertinent. Although the administrative capacity of institutions has improved in recent 
years, the functionality of key institutions continues to rest on international intervention. 
Unlike six years ago, most intervention has shifted from outright imposition to strong 
international coaching of the law making process. 
Overall, transformation in Bosnia is mixed. Although the country has stabilized 
substantially since 1995 and accelerated economic reforms in the past years, it remains 
divided and highly dependent on external support to facilitate transformation. The state 
structure remains complex and often dysfunctional, reducing its capacity for democratic 
and transparent governance. 
While there are signs of unremitting progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina the state 
is still divided along ethnic lines, people vote in favor of their nationalist parties, deeper 
analyses of refugee return leads to the fact that vast majority of refugees found their new 
life abroad, mainly the older people are moving back to their previous homes, if not just 
to sell the property. The country is still deeply polarized and heavily dependent on 
outside assistance for everything from the provision of security to economic 
sustainability. 
However, without stronger efforts to accomplish reform requirements and 
apprehend indicted war criminals, membership in the European Union will remain a 
dream that looms over the horizon for the country. 
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IV. DEFENSE REFORM AND SOVEREIGNTY 
A. THE IMPLICATION OF DEFENSE REFORM IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
Both external and internal security are the most important deliverable political 
goods that state institutions can provide to their inhabitants. It is the manifestation that a 
state, indeed, has the monopoly over the means of force over the entire territory. 
However, debate among scholars about the best way of post-conflict nation- and peace-
building continues to rage. Several scholars support the idea of “security first” and others 
“slow democratization.” Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff argue that 
“establishing security and basic political stability should be the first – if not exclusive – 
objective of international interventions. Such interventions in an ideal world should 
leave, in their wake, viable states that have the capacity and instrumental authority 
independently to manage their internal security affairs because the alternative – a relapse 
into anarchy and violence – is a far worse outcome.”205 Larry Diamond agrees: “In post-
conflict situations in which the state has collapsed, security trumps everything else: it is 
the central pedestal that supports all else. Without some minimum level of security, 
people cannot engage in trade and commerce, organize to rebuild their communities, or 
participate meaningfully in politics. Without security, a country has nothing but disorder, 
distrust, desperation – an utterly Hobbesian situation in which fear and raw force 
dominates.”206 To the contrary, those who support “democratization first” contend that 
holding elections and turning over responsibility to local authorities as quickly as 
possible is the best course of action for the International Community to take.207 
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Defense reform is always an extremely difficult task, irrespective of time and 
place. This is even truer in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because in the transition 
from state socialism to … the country has had to face the memories of the recent armed 
conflict and the fact of ethnic cleansing. In this circumstance, the two distinct entities are 
asked to serve one country that is yet ethnically deeply fragmented. In deeply divided, 
heterogeneous societies, “maintenance of ethnic balance within the military or police 
forces has pivotal importance in guaranteeing that one group will not be able to use 
overwhelming organized violence against the other. This political check and balance can 
serve to stabilize group relations and ensure that no group can be exploited by the 
other.”208 
Bosnia emerged from the war as a deeply divided society, with an army which 
was underdeveloped, over-politicized, as  was the case in all socialist states right after the 
end of the cold war, and structured along ethnic and religious lines. The over-politicized 
nature of post-communist states posed troubles not only to the military but the civilian 
actors as well because civil societies could hardly evolve under the pressure and control 
of the Communist party. Thus, the armed forces were an instrument of the Party to 
control external security, but also internally. Instead of monitoring the use of force by the 
military, civil society was to be monitored by the armed forces, police and the 
intelligence services.209 In an established democracy, with strong traditions of civilian 
control of the armed forces, the process of defense reform can be limited to ‘a change of 
hardware’, like restructuring or professionalization. In post-communist societies, 
however, the biggest challenge is arguably the ‘change of software’, namely the whole 
culture and mentality of the defense establishment.210 It cannot be separated from the 
reform of the civilian sector; both are mutually constitutive. 
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Moreover, at the end of the war there were three armies of three warring parties, 
two of whom did fight for secession and dissolution of BH. Now DPA was imposed upon 
them, they did not sign onto it, a new state is created and they are supposed to make it 
viable. To keep the option of secession open and because of distrust towards the others, 
they do all that they can to keep their armies. But then state viability is seriously 
undermined. The International Community accepted this for many years, until they 
realized that this is not workable. The three different armies prevented and seriously 
undermined the viability of the Bosnian state. It is a fundamental principle of statehood to 
be able to defend its territorial integrity, political independence and preserve sovereignty. 
To own this capacity, a state must control its single armed forces. Defense reform thus is 
a conditio since qua non for long-term state viability. 
Following the demise of Yugoslavia,  war torn Bosnia has been struggling to find 
a new and stable stage for providing physical security and reforming its defense policies 
for its inhabitants. The Bosnian Presidency expressed its goal in June 2001 to join with 
the European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions such as the EU and NATO. 
According to Jess Pillegaard, “the primary incentive was arguably found at the political-
ideological level: Membership of NATO represented a return to the “Western” 
hemisphere.”211 
The process of reorienting the national defense strategies and structures towards 
NATO membership has been a tremendous challenge for the countries which joined those 
institutions in 1999 and 2004. The process has been burdened with difficulties and is far 
from being completed. The new members of the Alliance are still lagging behind and are 
a long way from becoming effective and credible military allies which are capable of 
functioning in an integrated multinational military structure. Since NATO is the major 
promoter of defense reform in the Euro-Atlantic area, one can clearly state that defense 
reform is “one of the top-priority objectives for both NATO members and Partnership 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP) 
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community,”212 with repercussions for democratization far beyond the defense sector. 
However, Bosnia and Herzegovina have had to face several other difficulties as well. The 
weak central state, political division among the nationalist parties and societal turmoil are 
hurdles that work against a genuine reform of the military. 
B. FROM DAYTON TO THE BEGINNING OF DEFENSE REFORM 
EFFORTS 
The DPA created a weak central state and relatively strong entities, which 
continued to be responsible for their own defense and military matters. Thus, the central 
state did not have any effective control over the military as concerns command, control 
and oversight because the separate military forces were organized and commanded at the 
entity level. The Bosnian army after the end of the war was composed of three highly 
politicized command elements, each under the control of an ethnically homogeneous 
territory. Weak civilian control below the head of state, almost no connectivity or 
communication between the Defense Ministries and the general staff, lack of 
transparency in budgeting and administration, and weak parliamentary oversight were 
peculiar to the Bosnian military after the end of the war. The post-war environment was 
characterized by fragmented political authority and lack of trust.213 
Dayton avoided the security dilemma-inducing measure of deep demobilization, 
creating a single unified army. Instead, it allowed the new quasi-statelets of Republika 
Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation to keep their own armies in the hopes that a 
balance of power could be engineered that would provide stable inter-ethnic deterrence. 
However, the complexity of the situation was further illuminated by the fact that the 
country, in practice, had three armed forces: the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ARBiH), the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) and the Croat Defense 
Council (HVO). Thus, not only did each Entity have its own army, but the FBiH Army, 
though designed as a single force, was effectively divided into the Army of the 
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Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH), and the Croat Defense Council 
(HVO).214 Each of the three armies was loyal to its respective nationalist party: the Party 
of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croat 
Democratic Community (HDZ). Although the leading nationalist parties have lost 
exclusive political influence over their respective armies in the post-conflict period, the 
armies remain highly politicized, which significantly impedes the process of establishing 
democratic control of the military.215 The final result of the three different armies was 
three distinct and parallel chains of command and levels of authority, creating diverging 
command and control arrangements extending from both the state and entity levels. 
Reform of the armed forces has been one of the most sensitive issues in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Since the new state 
constitution did not designate explicitly “defense” as a state obligation, under the terms of 
the DPA, “defense matters were largely left in the hands of the entities rather than with 
the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”216 Each entity was responsible for its own 
defense and has its own armed forces. Although the FBiH Army was designed as a single 
force, it was divided into the Army of the (Bosniak-Muslim) Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (AFBiH) and the (Croat) Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane (HVO).217 Since Bosnia 
declared its willingness to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), this lack of the 
central command and control authority over the armed forces, and the independent 
authority of the entities to control and command military forces became a major 
impediment for integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. In effect, the entity 
armed forces have been primarily developed to defend the territory of each respective 
entity and are not geared to the imperative of the defense of the entire state.218 
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Thus, the view prevailed that the state constitution assigned defense and military 
matters to the entities rather than to the central government. This view mistakenly 
equated ‘defense’ with ‘military matters,’ ignoring that ‘defense’ is a political function 
related to external security policy, and thus primarily of a foreign policy character, which 
the constitution had assigned to the state-level. This, in effect, perpetuated the war 
situation. Indeed, the bitter irony of this situation was characterized by the statement that 
‘the only enemy for a Bosnian soldier is another Bosnian soldier.’219 
The DPA conceived military reform in terms of a division and balance of power 
between the two (almost ethnically homogeneous) entities. The development of a ‘train 
and equip’ program, a program that the U.S. had designed during the war and just could 
not realize due to resistance of the allies, was agreed upon among Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the US specifically to build up the military capabilities of the FBiH 
Army, so that it would be as strong and professional as its opponent during the war, the 
Army of the Republika Srpska.220 
Defense reform lagged after the implementation of the initial downsizing of the 
BiH armed forces in 2001–2002, which was carried out in several phases of negotiation 
with OSCE and NATO mediation according to the DPA. Apart from the detrimental 
political effect, the existence of ethnically based, parallel security institutions has become 
a huge drain on BiH public resources, and the country has spent more than five per cent 
of GDP on defense every year since the conclusion of the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement.221 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) has stated that defense 
expenditures are bankrupting the Bosnian state. The financial impasse has given the 
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international community new leverage for insisting on reform, also using offers of 
training and equipment for restructured forces as a ‘carrot.’222 
C. DEFENSE REFORM IN 2003 – THE GLASS HALF FULL 
After several well documented instances of the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) acting 
without being authorized by the entity parliaments, clear evidence emerged in early 2003 
that the VRS had been supplying technology to the Saddam regime in Iraq in defiance of 
the UN embargo. The scandal revealed serious failures in the command and control 
structures of the armed forces and a total lack of adequate political/civilian and state level 
supervision.223 This was a clear challenge to the notion of civilian oversight of the 
military, and in the (largely one-sided) ensuing debate the High Representative gained 
agreement that a Defense Reform Commission (DRC) should be established to deal with 
the systemic weaknesses that had been found. The High Representative’s direction was 
that since the status quo had been proven to be inadequate, some authority over the EAF 
had to be transferred to the BiH level if the EAF were not to be dismantled.224 
The DRC was headed by an eminent international,225 with membership drawn 
from the BiH and entity governments and parliaments, as well as international members 
and key embassies. This was a novel approach. There had been a long series of initiatives 
in the past aimed at reforming various areas, but the reform bodies were either comprised 
soley of locals or soley of internationals. Having this mix meant that nothing was agreed 
that was not “bought in to” by the locals. The DRC met over the summer of 2003, and 
after hard bargaining produced its report,226 which included a proposal for a new State 
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Law on Defense and detailed the state level command and control supremacy over the 
armed forces of BiH as well as a new agreed structure. As a result, significant reforms 
were pushed through in 2003 towards the establishment of a unified armed forces 
command, including the OHR’s decision in April 2003 to abolish the Republika Srpska’s 
Supreme Defense Council in order to prevent contravention of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement and its prohibition against having separate military command structures. A 
key step was the creation of a single, central defense establishment – which became 
possible once the Muslim nationalist Party of Democratic Action dropped its demands for 
a single, unified army.227 Under heavy pressure from the international community, the 
BiH authorities agreed to the establishment of a state-level central command and control 
of the two armies, which will now have a single flag and uniform, but will remain 
ethnically distinct.228 The entities will retain separate armed forces and defense ministries 
for “administrative” functions. The BiH state-level defense ministry and general staff will 
be responsible for ‘higher functions’ and the supreme command would be the BiH joint 
presidency, which will make decisions based on consensus.229 This hybrid structure was 
just an intermediate step in a longer-term vision to abolish the entity forces. The defense 
reform had to continue because the “transfer of the remaining entity competencies in the 
defense field to the state level” was to be accelerated with the aim of creating “a modern 
and affordable defense system that has the confidence of all citizens of BiH, under full 
and unambiguous state level command and control.”230 
The intended end state at this stage was acceptance of BiH into NATO’s PfP 
scheme. The DRC proposed that a small BiH level Ministry of Defense should be 
established, with operational command over the EAF, which would thereby become the 
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Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH). Administrative command would, however, remain with 
the Entities. In order to authorize the establishment of these new institutions at BiH level 
a new BiH Defense Law was required, and amendment was also needed to the 
Constitutions of BiH and of the entities, as well as amendments to a number of other 
laws. The BiH Defense Law was passed on 1 December 2003,231 and the supporting 
legislation passed all parliamentary procedures by the late spring of 2004.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Chain of Command at the End of 2003232 
 
Some specific benchmarks set for BiH for being ready for invitation to join PfP 
were detailed by the NATO Secretary General, ranging from “democratic parliamentary 
control and oversight of the armed forces; transparency in defense plans and budgets; 
development of a Bosnian security policy; and common doctrine, training and equipment 
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standards.”233 Some others were technical, with one requirement that the BiH MoD be 
manned to 66 per cent of its establishment, while a further precondition required full 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by 
detaining and surrendering of the two most wanted indictees for war crimes to The 
Hague. The reform also encompassed a 40 percent reduction in the overall size of the 
armed forces down to 12,000 soldiers and a reduction of the reserve forces from 240,000 
to 60,000. The reduction of the reserve force was particularly important in order to allow 
for a future downsizing of the enormous weapons stockpiles in BiH, which are exceeding 
legitimate defense needs.234 
D. THE PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIH DEFENSE LAW IN 
2004 
The mandate of the DRC was extended to the end of 2004, with the reasonable 
expectation that sufficient progress would be made for BiH to become a viable PfP 
candidate by the NATO Summit in June 2004. The Presidency took a bold and welcome 
step in retiring all the generals with wartime service and appointed a complete new 
generation of general officers. However, the Entity Governments, particularly the 
Republika Srpska, adopted a minimalist approach to implementing the agreement and the 
new law.235 Support was most obvious on the Bosniak side, which was generally in favor 
of strengthening state power in all areas. The Croats, too, were in favor of the proposal, 
as they hoped to gain more influence in state institutions than as junior partners in the 
Federation. The Serbian side proved relatively flexible in substance, but became 
uncooperative when terms such as ‘state-level Ministry of Defense’ was introduced, or 
when it appeared that the Dayton Constitution would be challenged with respect to the 
distribution of competencies between the state and the entities.236 The RS still resisted 
early attempts at defense reform, not because of a perceived military threat but because 
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the command over its armed forces was viewed as the last symbol of their implicit claim 
to statehood and sovereignty. This resistance was, however, overcome when their 
political and military elite were significantly weakened when clear evidence emerged in 
early 2003 that the VRS had been supplying technology to the Saddam regime in Iraq in 
defiance of the UN embargo. This was a clear challenge to the notion of civilian 
oversight of the military, and in the ensuing debate the High Representative gained 
agreement that a Defense Reform Commission (DRC) should be established to deal with 
the systemic weaknesses that had been found.237 
Any aspect of implementation which was not explicitly mandated was subject to 
delay. Thus, a relatively simple mechanism for offering candidates to man the BiH MoD 
became a drawn-out wrangle, incidentally not confined to the Serbs alone. On 24 March 
2004, the Presidency adopted a decision on the size and organization of BiH’s armed 
forces.238 It called for further reduction of the entity armed forces, whereby the number 
of professional soldiers of the Armed Forces would be limited to a total of 12,000 (8,000 
for the VFBiH and 4,000 for the VRS). The number of conscripts was to be reduced to 
12,600, including 8,400 in the VFBiH and 4,200 in the VRS. The reservist strength was 
set at 60,000 members (40,000 in VFBiH and 20,000 VRS).239 
Moreover, the budget that was finally agreed to fell short of what would be 
needed for early implementation. Adequate premises for the new MoD were not 
forthcoming, and the process of selecting the BiH Minister of Defense was politicized to 
an unfortunate degree. Progress was made, but it was made on an opportunistic rather 
than a systematic basis. In some areas, such as Military Intelligence Reform and 
Personnel policy, the level of expertise that was needed in order to engage in detailed 
discussions was not immediately available from within the International community. 
Progress only occurred with the advent of credible Subject Matter Experts. Moreover, the 
tendency among the international military to continue to treat service inside BiH as an 
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operational tour, long after the operational tempo had slowed down, resulted in a high 
turnover of internationals.240 At that juncture the longer tenure of Internationals involved 
in civil implementation really started to pay dividends. An example of best practice can 
be seen in the field training exercise that was organized by the OSCE in April 2004 to 
practice disaster relief inter-entity cooperation. This was more a demonstration than an 
exercise, involving primarily the civil protection agencies in adjacent municipalities 
across the Inter Entity Boundary Line. The significance of this exercise was to have the 
first officially sanctioned crossing of the IEBL by any element of the EAF since 1996. Its 
symbolism was further enhanced by the appointment, a few days earlier, of the first BiH 
Minister of Defense. The media coverage was used to publicize the new appointment 
widely, and this resulted in much heightened awareness of the progress made to date in 
Defense Reform.241 
Still at the NATO Summit in 2004 it was concluded that sufficient progress had 
not yet been made, and NATO declined to invite BiH to join PfP. Additionally, there 
continued to be examples of defiance of the attempts to normalize the EAF. In late 2004 
it was widely reported that Ratko Mladic had taken refuge in an isolated VRS military 
base in the summer, and the subsequent investigation revealed that he had been receiving 
pay until 2004 from the RS MoD. The slow pace of implementation, coupled with the 
regular revelations of scandals within the BiH military, led the NATO Secretary General 
to amend the conditions set for BiH and to urge that full administrative command, 
including personnel management, training and logistics be passed to the BiH MoD. 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, NATO was able to conclude that the Stabilization 
phase of its mission had achieved enough success by mid 2004 to make a large-scale 
return to conflict impossible. Accordingly, SFOR concluded its mission in December 
2004 and handed over to EUFOR. 
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E. FULL IMPLEMENTATION IN 2005 – THE FULL GLASS 
The new BiH Defense Minister was appointed as Co-Chair of the DRC soon after 
he had been installed in 2004. When the international lead in Defense reform passed from 
OSCE to NATO in December 2004 the DRC Mandate was extended for another year by 
the High Representative and a new international Co-Chair was appointed. Early analysis 
of the new DRC mandate and the new requirements set by the NATO Secretary General 
led to the realization that the 2003 Defense Law would need substantial modification, and 
that a completely new BiH law on service in the Army would be needed. This was 
reinforced by the Tri-Presidency’s aspiration that BiH should now move to make itself a 
viable candidate for full NATO membership, rather than confining itself to membership 
of PfP. The desired end state was to create the conditions to transform the AFBiH into a 
Single Military Force.242 
In early 2005, the defense minister (as one co-chair of the DRC) initiated a 
defense review. By midyear, a general consensus appears to have been achieved that 
encompassed the elimination of entity competences, a transfer to the state of all defense 
responsibilities and personnel, the abolition of conscription, and a restructured, smaller 
reserve force.  
However, at the last DRC meeting in June, the Bosniaks showed signs of shying 
away from the general package; they tabled proposals to retain conscription and a reserve 
force. The RS, on the other hand, and particularly the SDS, showed signs that they were 
ready to cooperate and support defense reform. This was most likely because President 
Cavic was personally interested and knowledgeable about it. He had an understanding 
that command and control of defense forces had to be located at the state level, assessing 
that the army of the RS had already been reduced to a symbolic level and, further, that if 
he conceded on defense, he could hold a firmer line on police reform.243 
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All defense reform legislation was scheduled to enter into force on January 1, 
2006. This was no small achievement, especially as it meant that the entities lost not only 
their ministers of defense (who became obsolete on December 31, 2005), but also much 
of their property previously in military use by the respective entity armies.244 
Successful defense reform was the major criteria of joining NATO’s PfP; police 
reform has been one of the most important preconditions for signing the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. Besides, the military reform is 
only one component of security, and other security institutions such as police, border 
services are even more vital for the security of individuals. During the war the police 
were a key ethnic cleansing instrument, particularly in RS and the Croatian areas of the 
Federation. After the war, similarly to the armies, Bosnia was left with three police 
forces: Bosniak, Croat and Serb, each with its own jurisdiction.245 
Similarly to defense reform, police reform has been predominantly driven by the 
International Community, however, with much less success. In 2005, representatives of 
Republika Srpska refused to agree to the proposed police reform efforts mainly because 
they could not accept the abolition of the Republika Srpska Police. Thus, the reform of 
police remains one of the key challenges for SAA, and further efforts will be needed. 
Eventual agreement was reached on the new outline defense structure. One 
significant source of concern was the need to preserve the best of the traditions of the 
different elements of the Entity Armed Forces. One of the most significant developments 
in 2005 was the successful deployment to Iraq of a multi-ethnic Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal platoon. The experience on operations was that it was indeed possible for a unit 
made up of elements of the three constituent peoples of BiH to operate successfully. 
                                                 
244 Freedom House Report, “Nations in Transition 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 11. 
245 International Crisis Group Europe Report no. 180. “Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New 
International Engagement Strategy,” (February 15, 2007): 14. 
 105
 
Figure 7.   Chain of Command in January 2006246 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The defense reform efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have faced many more 
difficult challenges than in any other state and represent a momentous step illuminating 
that “defense” is a state function. The difficulty of this mission can be connected to 
several factors ranging from the over-politicized nature of the inherited communist army, 
the ethnic fragmentation of the military, the fresh memory of the war and the 
constitutional fabric of the Dayton Peace Accords. The architects of a new, unified army 
had to conquer the hurdles by the plethora of these troubling questions. 
While just after the end of the war the DPA rightly defined the necessary military 
tasks, the international community realized that defense reform was as much a political 
process as a military one. Thus, coordinated action on both fronts was needed. The 
                                                 
246 Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, “AFBiH: A Single Military Force for the 21st 
Century,” Available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/NHQSA/2005%20DRC%20Report/Report2005-eng.pdf 
(accessed: February 26, 2007). 
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defense reform process was a military matter with political overtones. The powers of the 
civilian High Representative were sufficiently strong to initiate and accomplish the 
relevant tasks. The defense reform process accelerated and has been particularly rapid 
since 2003 and the creation of a Defense Reform Commission to oversee the process. 
Under Commission auspices, Bosnian officials have established new state-level defense 
institutions to support their country’s strategic objective of integration into Euro-Atlantic 
political and security structures.  
The state’s monopoly on the use of force was strengthened with the establishment 
of a joint state level command over the armed forces of the two entities in 2004. Due to 
the presence of international peacekeepers (IFOR/SFOR and EUFOR since November 
2004), the state does not maintain a full monopoly on the use of force. However, the 
number of international peacekeepers has been declining in recent years (2,500 in 2006) 
and they do not challenge the sovereignty of the state. Finally, the new Defense Law, 
which came into force on 1 January 2006, dissolved the separate entity Ministries of 
Defense and incorporated them into the unified BiH MoD. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
finally, joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in December 2006.  
Despite all the difficulties, the efforts in the last twelve years seem to be a success 
in the field of defense in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The incentive of PfP and then NATO 
membership proved to be strong enough to overcome the serious obstacles to reform. 
NATO’s conditionality thus paid off. The size, structure and stationing of the army have 
been changed, independently from ethnic affiliation, even if—several times—the Serb or 
Croat nationalist elements turned the whole process into a minefield. 
Today, while the unified military can be the first model of a viable state level 
institution in BiH, still there are three different entities within the unified military. The 
creation of a single defense establishment and single military force in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina clearly separated the defense structure from entity institutions and put them 
under state-level control. The successful implementation of the defense reform process 
proves the acceptance of the supremacy of the state in defense matters. Nevertheless, it 
has to be taken into consideration that this success would not have been possible without 
immense international investment. 
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The introduction of this specific case of state viability reinforces the preliminary 
theory, namely that a unified military is a necessary prerequisite to state viability. On the 
other hand, the defense reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed that the 
success came only with immense and never-ending international investment and under 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The thesis first, in its theoretical chapter, investigated the various conceptions of 
the state and the changing meanings of the basic criteria of the Westphalian modern state. 
The primary intention was to investigate the major attributes of a viable state. The thesis 
concludes that a weak state can be best defined as the mirror-opposite of the strong state. 
Thus, the viability of the state in BiH was scrutinized closely through the lenses of 
selected attributes of weak states, looking particularly at the success or failure of the 
provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords. The Defense Reform was selected as the main 
indicator for Bosnia’s future state viability. 
On a conceptual level, the thesis illuminates that the state, even in a globalized 
world, still needs to possess the main (Westphalian) attributes: control of its territory, 
monopoly on the use of force, provision of basic public services and delivery of essential 
political goods (most importantly security) to the whole population (regardless of 
ethnicity). Given these attributes, the state is regarded as legitimate by the majority of a 
population (representative, regardless of ethnicity) and seen as a viable representative on 
the world stage. 
The relationship between state failure/weakness and ethnic conflict is not a one-
way street. The relationship is in many cases circular, with the two phenomena feeding 
upon each other. State weakness provides the political space necessary for the 
intensification of conflict among ethnic groups, and ethnic conflict in turn further erodes 
and undermines the viability of the state. Suffering from acute insecurity, individuals 
often turn to political factions, ethnic groups, or even criminal gangs to provide them 
with protection in exchange for their loyalty and contribution—financial, physical, or 
both—to the war effort. 
When states fail, the leadership tends to point the finger at the most vulnerable 
group, those that others perceive as “outsiders.” When there are conflict-facilitating 
factors, such as trigger points and spoilers, and weak state institutions (as was the case in 
BiH), the state is much more vulnerable. This is what happened in Bosnia. The people in 
Bosnia lived together for decades without a care for who was a Muslim and who was a 
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Christian or an Orthodox. It is the contention of this thesis that the break-up of 
Yugoslavia was a top-down state collapse. It was perpetuated by a political leadership 
that did not recognize the core vulnerabilities of state institutions (and the very rogue 
elements operating in the security forces) and politicized something that burned out of 
control far too quickly. BiH (and the Yugoslav model itself) was not the cause of the 
breakup. Historically, that region of the world, (although Kosovo should be excluded 
from this statement), has remained integrated despite racial and ethnic tensions. I would 
also argue that the version of Muslim radicalism that has gripped many other parts of the 
world did not affect the Balkans for various reasons. Thus it was easier to cast differences 
aside because language and recent history were so similar. It was only the political 
manipulation of lingering tensions (plus root causes such as a slowing economy and 
rising unemployment) that allowed people to really believe that they were “different” 
from each other. 
Bosnia is an interesting case because the formula that Tito used to keep the state 
integrated was the same formula that Milosevic used to tear it apart. The only difference 
was that Tito presided over a state (federation) that was viable because it was successful; 
whereas, Milosevic presided over a republic that was failing. Tito knew that the “ethnic 
card” would be death to Yugoslavia, so he never played it. Milosevic obviously thought 
that it would save him from being held accountable for his failure as the country 
crumbled from within. Essentially, his way of spinning his failure was to blame the 
minorities. 
In the aftermath of the three and a half years war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Dayton Peace Accords have brought much hope for peaceful resolution but have also 
confronted major difficulties. The vast majority of both the scholarly literature and the 
reports of the INGOs in Bosnia equally conceive the implementation of the military 
aspects as a success. The possibility for rapidly reducing the number of troops deployed 
to the country is a testimony to that. At the end of 2004, the EU took over the leading role 
from NATO and is now seriously considering replacing the military mission with a 
civilian one. 
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In terms of civilian aspects, evidence illuminates that while significant progress 
has been achieved in the last twelve years in Bosnia, the country “is being out-performed 
by many of its neighbors, and year by year BiH is falling behind others in Eastern 
Europe.”247 Recently, delay of the closure of the Office of the High Representative, for 
still another year, is a signal that twelve years after the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accord (DPA) in December 1995, the Bosnian government is still not self-sustaining. 
Peace is still fragile. 
While the central government is functional, it still suffers from a lack of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. The country, as a semi-protectorate, is governed by 
the High Representative, who is a sui generis international actor established through the 
DPA. While elections are free and fully organized by the Bosnian authorities, the election 
campaigns reveal radical nationalist rhetoric even in the case of less nationalist parties. 
Division between ethnic lines continues to remain pertinent. The power-sharing system 
created by the DPA reified, cemented, and institutionalized ethnic cleavages, especially 
in state institutions. An absence of strong multi-ethnic parties and the long-lasting 
domination of dogmatically nationalist parties are reflections of the insecurity that still 
prevails. As Friedman argued, “in contemporary Bosnia there is little room for anyone 
who does not follow a national agenda, as politicians seem to consider Bosnian politics a 
zero-sum game.”248 
Further findings of the empirical chapters of the thesis revealed that in the 
memories of the people in Bosnia, war is still something very fresh. Ordinary people do 
not want it to happen again. On the local level, people want to feel safe and not to be 
subjects of discrimination (which can take many different forms and is sometimes 
extremely difficult to detect). Because of the grievances created by the war, there is still a 
level of mistrust between the various ethnic groups or nationalities, and people tend to 
believe that they will be safe and will be provided good services by the administration 
only if the administration is headed by members of their own ethnic group. It is because 
                                                 
247 National Human Development Report 2005: Better Local Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/docs/reports/national/BIH_BOSNIA_HERCEGOVINA/bosnia_2005_en.pdf (accessed: 
12 April 2007). 
248 Friedman, 84. 
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of this mistrust that we still have the three-member Presidency; that a minister and his 
deputy come from two different ethnic groups and that the BiH Parliament/RS Assembly 
have House of Peoples and veto mechanisms. This situation renders institutions that are 
slow and have limited effectiveness. 
Effectiveness is truly a victim of mistrust (which explains how people vote), but 
that is also the case in other post-conflict multi-ethnic states, such as Macedonia. It is 
better to have institutions that are not the most effective ones than it is to have no 
institutions at all – institutions have to be accepted by the people if they are to function. If 
lack of trust is the core problem, it is counter-productive to bully certain changes: 
bullying usually does not improve trust. Bosnians have to work with what they have, 
improve relations among the ethnic groups, get rid of extremists of all colors and change 
the governmental structure step by step in accordance with improving trust. Effectiveness 
of institutions will, with time, become more important than protection mechanisms that 
render them ineffective. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina today the perceived “bullies” are being separated from 
the “victims.” The international community was fairly inexperienced in dealing with 
these phenomena collectively after the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the truce in 
Bosnia which perpetuated ethnic segregation was merely a means to stop the bloodshed. I 
argue that the international community did not try enough in the aftermath to institute 
mechanisms aimed at reintegrating the three communities well enough, both top-down 
and bottom-up. What has remained in that aftermath is for the three communities 
(Bosniak, Croat and Serb) to continue to operate as “miniature states” inside the 
collective state of BiH. 
Bosnia has made strong progress in the last twelve years, but it is argued here that 
it is not yet a viable state because it does not hold many of the attributes of state viability. 
The state is weak, ineffective, and commands little respect. International presence is, 
therefore, crucial for state survival. It is better off than some of its other war-torn 




security provided by the European Union and NATO. Would war break out again if the 
EU and foreign troops left? Probably not. But the reason has to do more with “war 
weariness” than actual reconciliation. 
Ethnic conflict is often motivated by underlying root causes that have nothing to 
do with ethnicity. In the case of Bosnia, it was rampant corruption and an outdated, 
Soviet-style, economic system that had begun to fail. Furthermore, it was also spill-over 
of nationalism from Serbia and then Croatia and the fatal decision of others to secede. 
When the leadership could no longer take care of the people, it stirred up ethnic fervor to 
distract from the fact that the state itself failed in its duties as a state. These duties were to 
provide basic services to the people and defend its territorial boundaries249 without the 
aid of militias or other rogue elements, thus the state undermined its own legitimacy in 
the eyes of the inhabitants. 
The tri-Presidency announced in 2001 their wish to join NATO and the European 
Union. This serves as a major incentive to increase state viability. Bosnia can enter 
Europe only as a functioning state. Therefore, before Bosnia can realize its aspirations of 
becoming part of integrated Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions, it must work out its 
internal integration problems. The defense reform process has had two symbolic 
meanings. First, providing security to Bosnian citizens is the most important political 
deliverable good of a state; this can be provided through a unified army. Second, NATO 
leaders are just not able and willing to speak to three different Ministers of Defense, and 
to cooperate with three different armies within the same country. With immense 
international investment, the reform of the military is a success, which seems to be the 
first unified state-level institution. The Defense Reform process thus testifies to an 
increasing willingness of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs alike to make the central state more 
viable. 
                                                 
249 Although there are no signs of further attempts from inside to secession, the latest report of the 
International Crisis Group, just during the polishing of this thesis revealed that the recent Serbian 
nationalist block is dissatisfied with Serbia’s current borders and cast a covetous eye on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing no. 46. “Serbia’s New 
Government: Turning from Europe,” (31 May, 2007) Available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b46_serbias_new_government__turning_fro
m_europe.pdf (accessed: June 4, 2007). 
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As the current High Representative has stated, “institutions that have been created 
by imposition will never function effectively unless Bosnians of all ethnicities buy in to 
them and until Bosnian citizens expect them, and not international organizations, to 
deliver reform, exercise democratic rules and procedures day by day in a bottom-up 
process of building the state. The challenge today is to make Bosnians aware that it is in 
their interest to get along, rather than to order them to live together.”250 This requires a 
shift in mindset both among Bosnians, who have grown accustomed to an intrusive 
international presence in their country, and within the international community, which 
has grown accustomed to being enablers of the culture of dependence. 
This thesis concludes that until all these fundamental issues are effectively 
addressed Bosnia will remain a weak, marginalized country replete with insecurity, 
divisions, and adversity. In seven short years, we will commemorate the 100th 
anniversary of the outbreak of WWI in 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to 
NATO and EU membership in 2014 can symbolically mark the end of a century of 
European turmoil and self-destruction. To achieve this goal not only does Bosnia have to 
do its best, but the European Union, NATO, and other international actors “must continue 
their effective partnership for as long as it takes to make reconstruction and stabilization 
in the region self-sustaining and irreversible.”251 
 
 
                                                 
250 Christian Schwarz-Schilling, High Representative for BiH, “Bosnia’s Way Forward,” (March 17, 
2006) http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressa/default.asp?content_id=36772, (accessed June /8, 2006). 
251 NATO Briefing, “NATO in the Balkans, Bringing Peace and Stability to the Balkans,” (February 
2005) Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf (accessed: 25 June 2006). 
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